Breaching the Fortress Wall: Understanding Terrorist Efforts to Overcome Defensive Technologies

Abstract

This product is part of the RAND Corporation monograph series.RAND monographs present major research findings that address the challenges facing the public and private sectors. All RAND monographs undergo rigorous peer review to ensure high standards for research quality and objectivity. The RAND Corporation is a nonprofit research organization providing objective analysis and effective solutions that address the challenges facing the public and private sectors around the world. R AND's publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors.R ® is a registered trademark. © Copyright 2007 RAND CorporationAll rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced in any form by any electronic or mechanical means (including photocopying, recording, or information storage and retrieval) without permission in writing from RAND. Cover design by Eileen Delson La Russo Photo by TSgt Cedric H. Rudisill, U.S. Air ForceThis research was sponsored by the United States Department of Homeland Security and was conducted under the auspices of the Homeland Security Program within RAND Infrastructure, Safety, and Environment.iii PrefaceTechnical countermeasures are key components of national efforts to combat terrorist violence. Efforts to collect data about and disrupt terrorist activities through human intelligence and direct action, information gathering, and protective technologies complement technical countermeasures, helping to ensure that terrorists are identified, their ability to plan and stage attacks is limited, and, if those attacks occur, their impact is contained.Given the potential effect of such measures on the terrorists' capabilities, it is not surprising that they act to reduce or neutralize the impact of defensive technologies on their activities. In the event that the terrorists' counterefforts are successful, the value and protection provided by defensive technologies can be substantially reduced. Through case studies of terrorist struggles in a number of nations, this document analyzes the nature and impact of such terrorist counterefforts on the value of defensive technologies deployed against them.The information presented here should be of interest to homeland security policymakers in that it identifies potential weaknesses in defensive technology systems, thereby informing threat assessment and providing a basis for improving the design of future defensive technologies. It extends the RAND Corporation's ongoing research on terrorism and domestic security issues. Related RAND publications include the following: Brian A. Jackson, John C. Baker, Peter Chalk, Kim Cragin, John V. Parachini, and Horacio R. Trujillo, Aptitude for Destruction, • This monograph is one in a series of studies examining technological issues in terrorism and efforts to combat it. This series focuses on understanding how terrorist groups make technology choices and respond to the technologies deployed against them. This research was sponsored by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Science an...

The Economics of Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism: A Survey (Part II)

“…Jackson et al 2007) However, continued attempts to target for example major airports such as Heathrow, who since 9/11 have seen a decisive increase in security measures, contradict the prediction that terrorists will seek the weakest link to minimize costs. It appears that they are willing to pay higher prices and take on greater risks for a potentially higher return on a more prestigious target.…”

“…As Jackson et al (2007) show, terrorist groups are capable of adapting to counterterrorism measures, e.g., by using different kinds of weapons or organization. For instance, a tightened airport control may simply result in an increased vulnerability of other parts of the transportation system, making attacks on public buses or trains more likely.…”

Communication Interception Technology (CIT) and Its Use in the Fight against Transnational Organised Crime (TOC) in Australia: A Review of the Literature

“…While Grabosky and Smith (1998) (Jackson et al, 2007) are now increasingly prevalent. Criminals have been found to programme mobile phones to send or receive from specific phone numbers and are known to exploit the easy availability and poor identity checks of mobile phone prepaid SIM (Subscriber Identity Module) cards along with access to cheap handsets.…”

“…Criminals have been found to programme mobile phones to send or receive from specific phone numbers and are known to exploit the easy availability and poor identity checks of mobile phone prepaid SIM (Subscriber Identity Module) cards along with access to cheap handsets. This allows them to reduce the risk of detection and interception and limits their links to other criminals ( Jackson et al, 2007;Waters, Ball & Dudgeon, 2008).…”

Theoretical and computational advances for network diversion

“…Finelli [17] discusses the use of airpower in "herding targets." Jackson et al [28] describe security measures designed to identify terrorists and "funnel them inward, where they can be isolated and engaged in a place and time of advantage to the authorities." In the context of counterdrug operations, Laughton [32] discusses the use of direct or indirect military actions and the way "they 'shape' the battlefield to 'funnel' the enemy for a future decisive engagement."…”