2012
DOI: 10.1016/j.socnet.2012.01.005
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Bringing the owners back in: An analysis of a 3-mode interlock network

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Cited by 21 publications
(19 citation statements)
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“…Suspicions that there is expropriation or tunneling in the transactions between companies seem feasible. It is worth emphasizing, also, that this effect was only visible when the social capital of the board was included in the model, which highlights the complementary nature between these variables in the investigation of the precedents of the cost of capital, as strongly suggested by Bohman [30].…”
Section: Discussionmentioning
confidence: 57%
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“…Suspicions that there is expropriation or tunneling in the transactions between companies seem feasible. It is worth emphasizing, also, that this effect was only visible when the social capital of the board was included in the model, which highlights the complementary nature between these variables in the investigation of the precedents of the cost of capital, as strongly suggested by Bohman [30].…”
Section: Discussionmentioning
confidence: 57%
“…All the previous arguments could be valid too for the effects of social capital on the cost of capital arising from ownership relationships because such relationships are associated with those of the board [30]. However, if the relationships are of another type, there is evidence that they operate differently [15,35].…”
Section: Hypothesis 2 the Larger The Heterogeneity Of Relational Resmentioning
confidence: 99%
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“…Empirical studies have shown that the separation in companies between ownership and management is only a formality; in terms of interfirm networks, the two are usually closely intertwined (Roy and Bonacich 1988;Windolf and Beyer 1996;Bohman 2012). For example, studies on the economic structure of large Japanese business groups (Lincoln et al 1992) show that cross-shareholding and interlocking directorate networks are the two very common control methods of business groups.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%