2009
DOI: 10.1080/03086530903157664
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Britain and the Indo-Pakistani Conflict: The Rann of Kutch and Kashmir, 1965

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Cited by 5 publications
(4 citation statements)
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“…Herein lie the reasons for India’s willingness to have the British mediate in this matter, for as Jonathan Coleman showed, ‘the moderate Shastri’ had, according to the then-UK High-Commissioner in India John Freeman, realized the ‘consequences for the sub-continent’ and was ‘receptive to our offer of good offices, though his ministerial colleagues were divided into “hawks” and “doves”’ (Colman, 2009, p. 468). By early June, however, Shastri was taking a harder line.…”
Section: Prologuementioning
confidence: 99%
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“…Herein lie the reasons for India’s willingness to have the British mediate in this matter, for as Jonathan Coleman showed, ‘the moderate Shastri’ had, according to the then-UK High-Commissioner in India John Freeman, realized the ‘consequences for the sub-continent’ and was ‘receptive to our offer of good offices, though his ministerial colleagues were divided into “hawks” and “doves”’ (Colman, 2009, p. 468). By early June, however, Shastri was taking a harder line.…”
Section: Prologuementioning
confidence: 99%
“…The tribunal, with ‘India represented by a Yugoslav and Pakistan by an Iranian’, took until February 1968 to come to any decision. It gave India ‘3,150 miles out of the 3,500 that the Pakistanis demanded’ and this decision was formally accepted by the two governments in July 1968 (Colman, 2009, p. 470).…”
Section: Prologuementioning
confidence: 99%
See 2 more Smart Citations