British Brinkmanship and Gaelic Games: EU Treaty Ratification in the UK and Ireland from a Two Level Game Perspective

Abstract

Viewed from the theory of two-level games, the European Union (EU) Act (2011) is a rare example of a government tying its hands in international diplomacy. • The UK government could find its hands more tightly bound than anticipated under the EU Act, inter alia, due to the enhanced role of the courts in EU treaty ratification. • The EU Act could convey bargaining advantages to the UK, but it could also encourage other EU member states to walk away from the negotiating table. • The risks posed by tighter ratification rules are borne out by Ireland's experience of EU treaty ratification since the Supreme Court ruling Crotty v. An Taoiseach (1987). • David Cameron's 'veto' of plans for a new EU treaty in December 2011 illustrates the difficulties of knowing ex ante when a referendum is required under the EU Act. The European Union (EU) Act (2011) provides for greater parliamentary oversight and the possibility of a referendum before EU treaties can be ratified. This article explores the EU Act from a two-level game perspective, seeing it as a rare example of a government tying its hands in international diplomacy. That the UK government could find its hands more tightly bound than anticipated is suggested by Ireland's turbulent experience of treaty ratification in the light of Crotty v. An Taoiseach (1987), a landmark ruling by the Irish Supreme Court and an inspiration for the EU Act. This situation could, the theory of two-level games predicts, bolster the UK's bargaining position in Brussels, but it could also damage the country's credibility and encourage other member states to walk away from the negotiating table. This last point helps to shed some light on the UK's 'veto' of the Fiscal Compact in December 2011.

EU referendums in context: What can we learn from the Swiss case?

“…These studies ‘spurred a still‐ongoing debate between two competing approaches to voting behaviour in EU referendums: the “attitude” school and the “second‐order election” school’ (Hobolt , p. 154–55; see controversy between Franklin and Svensson ). The second‐order explanation holds that EU referendums decide on national matters and are thus a plebiscite on the performance of national governments, with potential effects on states’ EU bargaining power (Hodson and Maher ; also Hobolt , p. 160).…”

The European Council and the legitimacy paradox of new intergovernmentalism: constitutional agency meets politicisation

“…At other times the European Council has sought to coordinate collectively across member states in order to control the way politicization takes place. EU leaders were notably active, for instance, in reminding Irish voters about the benefits of ever closer union in the two episodes in which the Irish government needed to re-run referendums in order to ratify both the Nice and Lisbon Treaties respectively (Hodson and Maher 2014). Indeed, the fact that no other country held a popular vote on the Lisbon Treaty testifies to the way national executives agreed not to politicize this treaty despites its close kinship to the doomed Constitutional Treaty (de Wilde and Zürn 2012).…”

“…Indeed, the treaty itself was designed to limit politicization of its ratification as it did not require unanimity as a condition of entry into force; it became legally binding when 12 Eurozone countries ratified it, thereby preventing last-minute ratification delays in obstreperous parliaments. In Ireland, the only country that held a referendum on the treaty, depoliticization was evident as the major opposition party supported the government campaign for a yes vote (Hodson and Maher 2014). The Fiscal Compact itself was thus another instance of the depoliticized and intergovernmental approach to reforming EMU in the wake of the sovereign debt crisis.…”

Euroskepticism’s Many Faces: The Cases of Hungary and the UK

“…Its second crucial element deals with approving EU treaties. It gives Parliament a greater say in the ratification process, specifies the conditions under which a public referendum must be held to ratify the treaty, and enhances the scope for UK judicial review of EU treaties (Hodson & Maher, 2014). This approach to EU law is unique to the United Kingdom, but unsurprising when viewed along with the historic British attitude towards European integration.…”