Taking economic co-ordination in EMU as a starting point, this article explores the development of the open method of co-ordination, addressing whether it is a new form of governance from two related perspectives. First, to what extent can the method be effectively applied outside the scope of economic policy? Second, will it lead to policy transfer to the EU and hence act only as a transitional mode of governance? Identified at the Lisbon European Council, the method codified practices such as benchmarking, target-setting and peer review developed in the Luxembourg, Cardiff and Cologne processes. The method offers a new approach to governance of the EU as a heterarchical, decentred and dynamic process. It supports and radicalizes the principle of subsidiarity; offers an alternative to the treaty rules on enhanced co-operation; and addresses some of the legitimacy issues inherent in the EU. In EMU, the method arose out of a specific policy framework with a common monetary policy complemented by the coordination of national economic policies. The recent recommendation issued against Ireland is the first example of the operation of the method in EMU and shows how debate can be stimulated and how different and arguably equally valid perspectives defended. The particular experience of EMU with a sound money, sound finance paradigm, a long history of projectbuilding by key elites and the central role of the European Council suggest similar conditions are required for the effective application of the method in other policy spheres. The context within which the method has operated to date is contingent and could change either over time or between policy fields. If so, the very openness of the method may serve to reconfigure the boundaries of competence between the Member States and the Union, after all.

There are differing views about the need for economic policy coordination in the EU and about the adequacy of the system that has evolved under EMU. This article examines the case for such policy coordination, then describes and assesses the current arrangements for both ‘hard’ coordination — epitomised by the much-maligned Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) — and the ‘soft’ forms of coordination that have evolved in the EU to complement formal rules. Although the system achieves more than is sometimes recognised, it is shown to have weaknesses. Options for reforming the SGP and other facets of the system are discussed.

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There is a double asymmetry in the structure of economic and monetary union (EMU). First, monetary policy is uniform while national economic policies are merely co-ordinated. The credibility of monetary policy is underwritten by an independent European Central Bank, but this is not suf cient as the objective of price stability depends on other aspects of economic policy. Thus greater coordination of national economic policies is needed to secure a credible monetary policy. This highlights the second asymmetry. The emphasis on credibility has been such that due regard has not been given to the legitimacy of the EMU policy architecture. If policy-making is to be effective, credible and legitimate, decisionmakers need to pay attention to four key legitimacy indicators: input, output, values and process. It seems inevitable that the success of the developing policy architecture and its effects, both in its monetary and economic dimension, will be judged against these broader standards.

Central to the internationalization of competition law has been the emergence of transnational networks of competition officials and experts. These networks have operated in three main areas: coordination on enforcement; technical assistance; and moves to develop overarching competition principles at the level of the WTO. The debate over the nature of internationalization of competition norms has fallen into three phases: early failures mainly due to the lack of any network; politicization of competition policy within a UN context followed by the emergence of a network primarily focused on the OECD. The current phase concerns coordination and the attempt to develop a competition law regime at the WTO level. This process is spearheaded by the European Union, with the United States of America favouring bilateral agreements on enforcement and technical assistance only. The way the debate has changed over the past ten years and how the two main protagonists have modified their positions, is indicative of the influence and importance of networks which, while they may give rise to formal agreements, can operate through soft power and persuasion. What emerges from the analysis is the centrality of these networks to this important aspect of contemporary international governance. They supplement rather than replace more traditional forms of internationalism and, while they may fundamentally regard themselves as technocratic, deriving legitimacy from outputs, current pressures on international policy making require them to attend to the process aspects associated with legitimacy of democratic regimes. 111