2016
DOI: 10.1080/09592318.2016.1190052
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British counterinsurgency in Brunei and Sarawak, 1962–1963: developing best practices in the shadow of Malaya

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Cited by 4 publications
(2 citation statements)
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“…The plan would be forcing the Sultan to announce proclamation in front of the newly built Grand Mosque in Brunei Town. The plan to capture Chief Minister also failed due to police reinforcement that outnumbered TNKU (Majid, 2007;Jamil, 2003;Shaw, 2016).…”
Section: Rebellion and International Responsesmentioning
confidence: 99%
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“…The plan would be forcing the Sultan to announce proclamation in front of the newly built Grand Mosque in Brunei Town. The plan to capture Chief Minister also failed due to police reinforcement that outnumbered TNKU (Majid, 2007;Jamil, 2003;Shaw, 2016).…”
Section: Rebellion and International Responsesmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Who was most responsible for the revolt itself sparked some speculations. Malaysian historians such as Ramlah Adam, supported by Alexander N. Shaw, argues that Indonesia has been behind the rebellion from the beginning, through its influence on PRB where its main figure, A. M. Azahari has a very close relationship with Indonesian political spectrum, especially the left and communist (Adam, 2004;Shaw, 2016). In some aspect, this is supported by both Kahin and Harclerode's which reveal the role of the Indonesian military assisting the preparation of the Tentara Nasional Kalimantan Utara (TNKU) or North Borneo National Army (the military wing of the PRB) both in training and arms throughout 1962 (Kahin, 2003;Harclerode, 2001).…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%