Notwithstanding an existential crisis, which has wracked its operations following the announcement of the death of its supreme leader Mullah Omar, the Taliban-led insurgency remains a potent force drawing their sustenance from a wide range of sources both within Afghanistan as well as outside. Not only has it been able to withstand the military prowess of a vast coalition of international forces for a decade and half but also it has grown in strength by coalescing with large number of anti-government elements and criminal networks in the Afghanistan–Pakistan (Af-Pak) region. The advent of the Islamic State (IS) has added an interesting competitive dimension for area domination between these groups resulting in a surge in violence levels. As the attempts to co-opt elements within the Taliban insurgency through peace deals and negotiations intensifies, the anti-talk constituency within the insurgency has demonstrated its capacity to scuttle such peace processes. Regional power politics, local political opportunism and criminal aspirations of individual groups will continue to inject life into the insurgency.

Much speculation abounds on India’s evolving policy towards post-2014 Afghanistan. While India’s aid-only policy in post-2001 Afghanistan has been criticized for piggy backing on the US military efforts, it has generated domestic debate, given the vulnerabilities its projects and personnel face in Afghanistan. The debate is bound to grow more intense as Afghanistan prepares for the inteqal (transition), and many countries including India need to indulge in tactical policy manoeuvring and readjustment in the light of the receding international military footprint by 2014. As the hasty announcements of withdrawal, largely perceived as exit by the Afghans and the regional powers, is pushing the country yet again to the maxims of uncertainty, New Delhi will have to prepare itself for a host of scenarios that may befall on the war-torn country after 2014. With Western countries heading for egress, can India consolidate or build on its decade-long gains through bilateral, institutional and regional cooperation beyond 2014. In the transformational decade (2014–2024), its policy markers in Afghanistan, however, has to navigate through the potentially challenging options of securing its own strategic, security and economic interests, averting a civil war or takeover by extremist forces in Afghanistan, balancing its ties with the difficult neighbours and preventing great power competition in the region.

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