Taliban: The Rebels Who Aspire to be Rulers

Abstract

Notwithstanding an existential crisis, which has wracked its operations following the announcement of the death of its supreme leader Mullah Omar, the Taliban-led insurgency remains a potent force drawing their sustenance from a wide range of sources both within Afghanistan as well as outside. Not only has it been able to withstand the military prowess of a vast coalition of international forces for a decade and half but also it has grown in strength by coalescing with large number of anti-government elements and criminal networks in the Afghanistan–Pakistan (Af-Pak) region. The advent of the Islamic State (IS) has added an interesting competitive dimension for area domination between these groups resulting in a surge in violence levels. As the attempts to co-opt elements within the Taliban insurgency through peace deals and negotiations intensifies, the anti-talk constituency within the insurgency has demonstrated its capacity to scuttle such peace processes. Regional power politics, local political opportunism and criminal aspirations of individual groups will continue to inject life into the insurgency.

Afghanistan’s Neo-Taliban Puzzle

“…The major reason for the growing influence of the movement is its ability to adopt new technologies and complete the transformation into tech-savvy insurgents. In this respect, the movement is totally different from the old Taliban movement, which denounced the use ‘of modern technology, photography and mass communication’ (D’Souza, 2016: 23). The new movement operates a sophisticated propaganda machine, a website, several Twitter accounts and a video arm that seeks to manipulate international public opinion, mainly in the NATO states that have supplied troops to the coalition forces (D’Souza, 2016: 23).…”

“…In this respect, the movement is totally different from the old Taliban movement, which denounced the use ‘of modern technology, photography and mass communication’ (D’Souza, 2016: 23). The new movement operates a sophisticated propaganda machine, a website, several Twitter accounts and a video arm that seeks to manipulate international public opinion, mainly in the NATO states that have supplied troops to the coalition forces (D’Souza, 2016: 23). While frequently exploiting digital technologies such as the internet and telecommunications to convey their messages, they have also consolidated their strategic communication effort ‘by focusing on Islamic, cultural, and nationalistic themes to solidify the movement’s master narrative’ (Johnson, 2018: 16).…”

“…Ethnic tensions within the Karzai regime and subsequent administrations pushed the Pashtuns to support neo-Taliban insurgents, the only alternative source of protection (Giustozzi, 2007; Tarzi, 2008). Competition among ethnic power holders has considerably increased recently, so that the prospects for another meltdown appear high (de Tray, 2019: 124). Given that insecurity, corruption, economic distress and perceptions of injustice among the people strengthen the neo-Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan, it would be tempting for the neo-Taliban to exploit these factors politically, but ‘the only creativity lies in adding a religious tinge to these concerns’ (Abbas, 2014: 201).…”

“…Before 2001, the Taliban was more of a monolithic movement, while the neo-Taliban movement is not a cohesive group under a single banner, but an umbrella organisation of diverse militant groups, marginalised clans and tribes and even criminal gangs (Johnson, 2018). After 2001, the insurgents relocated in the ‘Af-Pak’ region, ‘transformed into a composition of loosely affiliated and diffused units comprising of multiple networks of anti-government armed groups’ (D’Souza, 2016: 23), aspiring to be rulers and leaders of specific territories and groups. Rashid (2010: 236) argued earlier that the neo-Taliban are not a monolithic organisation but comprise several interest groups.…”

“…For this objective, the focus is on maintaining stability and security. The strategic intent is to construct a ‘good-enough foundation on which a country with international development assistance can begin to implement longer-term development and state-building programs’ (de Tray, 2019: 86). The second objective is achieved through ‘offensive combat operations’, basically to kill insurgents, particularly ‘hard-core extremists’, the ‘bad actors’ (Petraeus et al, 2007: 148–9).…”