British terrorism preemption: Subjectivity and disjuncture in Channel “de‐radicalization” interventions

Abstract

This article examines Channel “de‐radicalization” interventions, which take place on individuals suspected of having the potential to commit terrorist crimes. Situated within critical security studies, the article explores the British Prevent programme by utilizing primary interviews with hard‐to‐reach Channel mentors and senior Prevent officials. Following the work of anticipatory risk‐governance scholarship, this research illuminates the three processes of risk‐visibilization (how an individual becomes sufficiently “seen” as harbouring risk that they are offered Channel mentorship), risk‐calculation (how practitioners negotiate supposed riskiness), and risk‐knowing (how practitioners “know” risks they observe). It demonstrates how the practice of preemptive counter‐terrorism is subsumed inherently by—even relies upon—subjectivity and human prejudice, and fundamental disagreements between practitioners. Through substantial empirical contribution on the phenomenon of Channel interventions, the discussion highlights ultimately that the algorithmic rationale of preemptive risk‐spotting normalizes the suspicion of banal and everyday behaviors, precisely because such interventions are ultimately deployed through worst‐case imaginations.

The radical ambitions of counter‐radicalization

“…The institutional space in which this occurs is the Channel program. The active work carried out by a Channel process consists of three principle tasks: to identify individuals at risk from violent extremism; to assess the nature and extent of the risk; and, if considered suitable for a Channel intervention, to develop the most appropriate support for the individual concerned (Home Office, 2012; see Pettinger, 2020, pp. 4–5 for a fuller account of the Channel process).…”

“…Conceptually, the indicators are not concerned, primarily, with intent, but with attitudes or ways of being, and focus on the individual under analysis, divorced from wider, social contexts (Knudsen, 2018). As the work of Pettinger (2020) has empirically shown, Channel's concrete interventions are not concerned with violence. Based on interviews with Channel mentors, Pettinger (2020, p. 6) notes how individuals undergoing Channel interventions are seen to have little in common with offenders sentenced under terrorism legislation.…”

“…As the work of Pettinger (2020) has empirically shown, Channel's concrete interventions are not concerned with violence. Based on interviews with Channel mentors, Pettinger (2020, p. 6) notes how individuals undergoing Channel interventions are seen to have little in common with offenders sentenced under terrorism legislation. Rather, the reasons given by mentors for referral and acceptance onto Channel are due to the individual expressing offensive language and ideas.…”

The psychologisation of counter-extremism: unpacking PREVENT

“…11 Channel mentors (those providing ideological reprogramming) themselves admit that referrals are often founded on banal behaviours among individuals who pose no risk to others -raising the question of their inclusion in a police database, let alone the purpose of the entire procedure. 12 Scholars across disciplines have documented how and why Muslims are marginalised through counter-terrorism across the global North, as it relates to the wider web of Islamophobia. 13 The psy-disciplines (psychology and psychiatry) have received less attention, however, let alone psychologisation.…”

“…11 Channel mentors (those providing ideological reprogramming) themselves admit that referrals are often founded on banal behaviours among individuals who pose no risk to others – raising the question of their inclusion in a police database, let alone the purpose of the entire procedure. 12…”