This article examines Channel “de‐radicalization” interventions, which take place on individuals suspected of having the potential to commit terrorist crimes. Situated within critical security studies, the article explores the British Prevent programme by utilizing primary interviews with hard‐to‐reach Channel mentors and senior Prevent officials. Following the work of anticipatory risk‐governance scholarship, this research illuminates the three processes of risk‐visibilization (how an individual becomes sufficiently “seen” as harbouring risk that they are offered Channel mentorship), risk‐calculation (how practitioners negotiate supposed riskiness), and risk‐knowing (how practitioners “know” risks they observe). It demonstrates how the practice of preemptive counter‐terrorism is subsumed inherently by—even relies upon—subjectivity and human prejudice, and fundamental disagreements between practitioners. Through substantial empirical contribution on the phenomenon of Channel interventions, the discussion highlights ultimately that the algorithmic rationale of preemptive risk‐spotting normalizes the suspicion of banal and everyday behaviors, precisely because such interventions are ultimately deployed through worst‐case imaginations.

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