Broadening the Debate about War: The Inclusion of Foreign Critics in Media Coverage and Its Potential Impact on US Public Opinion

Abstract

In the US context, scholars have demonstrated that public support for military intervention is influenced by the elite debate as presented in the national news media and that the volume of elite criticism reported is largely determined by opposition in Congress. Because the media “index” the debate among officials in Washington, a lively and comprehensive airing of the pros and cons of a military intervention often depends upon Congressional leaders taking an oppositional stance. But sometimes, American reporters will incorporate a surge of foreign leaders' critical views, even when Congressional leaders support administration policy or when they choose to remain silent due to strategic considerations. The question addressed by this article is whether such departures from traditional indexing behavior—which bring foreign views into media coverage in a significant manner—can be predicted based on the circumstances and journalists' incentives. The article also explores whether high‐visibility opposition by credible foreign leaders, in particular United Nations officials and European allies, can substitute for partisan cues from domestic leaders and invigorate a national debate in a manner that influences public opinion.

A Bottom‐Up Theory of Public Opinion about Foreign Policy

“…To "learn what they need to know" (Lupia and McCubbins 2000) and form political judgments, members of the public thus turn to trusted cue-givers, typically prominent members of their preferred political party. Actual events matter on the ground less than what prominent Democrats 1 Cue-taking models of public opinion about foreign policy do not limit themselves exclusively to party leaders as cue-givers: Golby, Feaver, and Dropp (2017) look at the cue-giving effects of military generals; Hayes andGuardino (2011) andMurray (2014) at those of foreign leaders; Thompson (2006), Chapman (2011), and Grieco et al (2011 at the endorsement effects of international institutions; and Pease and Brewer (2008) at that of Oprah Winfrey. Actual events matter on the ground less than what prominent Democrats 1 Cue-taking models of public opinion about foreign policy do not limit themselves exclusively to party leaders as cue-givers: Golby, Feaver, and Dropp (2017) look at the cue-giving effects of military generals; Hayes andGuardino (2011) andMurray (2014) at those of foreign leaders; Thompson (2006), Chapman (2011), and Grieco et al (2011 at the endorsement effects of international institutions; and Pease and Brewer (2008) at that of Oprah Winfrey.…”

“…1 As a result, the balance of public opinion on foreign policy issues is largely driven in a topdown fashion by the balance of elite opinion (Berinsky 2007(Berinsky , 2009Brody 1991;Zaller 1992). Actual events matter on the ground less than what prominent Democrats 1 Cue-taking models of public opinion about foreign policy do not limit themselves exclusively to party leaders as cue-givers: Golby, Feaver, and Dropp (2017) look at the cue-giving effects of military generals; Hayes andGuardino (2011) andMurray (2014) at those of foreign leaders; Thompson (2006), Chapman (2011), andGrieco et al (2011) at the endorsement effects of international institutions; and Pease and Brewer (2008) at that of Oprah Winfrey. However, as we discuss below, all of these cue-givers are sufficiently socially distant from individual members of the public that we can think of a top-down logic as operating, even if the question of how the public weighs competing cues from multiple cue-givers remains an unanswered question.…”

Sheltering the president from blame: Drone strikes, media assessments and heterogeneous responsibility 2002–2014

“…The only previous content analysis work on drones has selected much shorter time spans (2009-2012 in Sheets et al, 2015), and this longer period allows us to gauge how reporting has changed over the duration of the US drone programme. These newspapers were selected because previous research draws on them as papers of record, especially in reporting on US foreign policy (Jordan, 1993;Murray, 2014). The use of newspapers was also important because the only previous study of drone strike framing was conducted with online news sources (Sheets et al, 2015).…”

Foreign Voices, Party Cues, and U.S. Public Opinion about Military Action

“…Americans may look to the international community for a "second opinion" about military endeavors, making a U.N. or NATO endorsement (or lack thereof) a strong signal about the likelihood of success or the wisdom of a proposed intervention (Fang 2008;Grieco et al 2011). This dynamic is especially likely when the mass media devote significant attention to foreign perspectives, as they have in the post-Cold War period (Althaus 2003;Hayes and Guardino 2010;Murray 2014). For instance, increases in media coverage of foreign elite opposition to the Iraq War were associated with decreases in support for military action in the months before the launch of the 2003 invasion (Hayes and Guardino 2013).…”

“…Despite the long-held conventional wisdom that international institutions and foreign elites play little role in shaping U.S. public opinion, a growing body of work has begun to demonstrate that Americans do sometimes take cues from non-domestic actors. Much of this literature finds that United Nations Security Council actions or rhetoric from overseas officials can affect support for American military interventions (Chapman 2011;Chapman and Reiter 2004;Grieco et al 2011;Hayes and Guardino 2013;Murray 2014). There is also evidence that the social policy choices of foreign nations and recommendations of international organizations can even influence public opinion about comparable domestic measures (Dragojlovic 2013;Linos 2011).…”