Although canonical models of clientelism argue that brokers use dense social networks to monitor and enforce vote buying, recent evidence suggests that brokers can instead target intrinsically reciprocal voters and reduce the need for active monitoring and enforcement. Combining a trove of survey data on brokers and voters in the Philippines with an experiment-based measure of reciprocity, and relying on local naming conventions to build social networks, we demonstrate that brokers employ both strategies conditional on the underlying social network structure. We show that brokers are chosen for their central position in networks and are knowledgeable about voters, including their reciprocity levels. We then show that, where village social networks are dense, brokers prefer to target voters who have many ties in the network because their votes are easiest to monitor. Where networks are sparse, brokers target intrinsically reciprocal voters whose behavior they need not monitor.Verification Materials: The data and materials required to verify the computational reproducibility of the results, procedures and analyses in this article are available on the American Journal of Political Science Dataverse within the Harvard Dataverse Network, at: https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/UTRXT7. E lectoral clientelism-the targeting of money, goods, or favors to influence voters-is a widespread phenomenon, common in nearly all developing democracies and many established democracies as well (Hicken 2011;Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007). 1 Whether the goal is vote buying (Stokes 2005), turnout buying (Nichter 2008), abstention buying (Cox and Kousser 1981), or ticket buying (Aspinall and Sukjamati 2016), a common theme across all these varieties of clientelism is the crucial role of brokers-the intermediaries between candidates and voters, and the lynchpins of clientelist campaign machines (Schmidt et al. 1977;Scott 1972;Stokes et al. 2013).Despite the pervasiveness of brokers, the logic behind the strategies they employ remains a key point of debate. Seminal models of clientelism argue that brokers are valuable to campaigns because their social embeddedness allows them to monitor voter behavior and enforce clientelistic exchanges (Brusco, Nazareno, and Stokes 2004;Camp 2017;Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007;Stokes et al. 2013). However, there is growing evidence that in some cases, brokers target electoral clientelism