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The optical quality of intraocular lenses (IOLs) of different materials that have been implanted from 16 to 44 years in human eyes was studied. The IOLs were explanted due to other causes than loss of transparency. The scattered light from the IOLs was assessed in two angular regimes by using dark field images (for wide angles) and the optical integration method (for narrower angles). No evident differences were found in the scattering intensities processed from the dark images. The explanted lenses presented slightly increased amounts of straylight between 1 and 5.1° when compared to a reference new unused lens.

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Does the partisanship of poll workers affect electoral outcomes? Many countries use partisan and adversarial vote-counting systems where poll workers are party representatives and mutual control is expected to provide fairness. Yet in countries with dominant party regimes, parties often have de facto unequal capacities to send representatives to all booths. Analyzing the 2018 general elections in Paraguay, we estimate that partisan poll workers decrease an opposing party's vote share by up to 2 percentage points (pp) and increase theirs by up to 1 pp. Our analyses also demonstrate how incentives for electoral manipulation vary by electoral system. Dominant parties' partisan poll workers collude against smaller parties more often in proportional representation races. In contrast, single-winner plurality voting yields less collusion because the winner-take-all aspect of these races make collusion difficult. Our results have practical implications for politicians and policymakers, as well as theoretical implications for elections in developing democracies.

How do party representatives as poll workers at electoral tables (voting booths) affect elections? Paraguay’s system of counting votes is partisan and adversarial. Every booth has three poll workers which are, by law, party representatives. In theory, multiple parties count votes at each booth, ensuring the integrity of elections. In practice, there are stark inequalities in partisan poll worker representation during the 2018 Paraguayan elections we study. We exploit a natural experiment to show that partisan poll workers decrease an opposing party's vote share by up to 2 percentage points (pp) and increase theirs by up to 0.7 pp. We also demonstrate how incentives for electoral manipulation vary by electoral system. Partisan poll workers collude more often with rival party poll workers within proportional representation races, as distributing votes among themselves can help their parties earn more seats for their legislative candidates. Instead, single-winner plurality voting yields less collusion.