Brokers, Voters, and Clientelism

Stokes, Susan C.; Dunning, Thad; Nazareno, Marcelo; Brusco, Valeria

doi:10.1017/cbo9781107324909

Cited by 1,014 publications

(399 citation statements)

References 1 publication

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“…Such support often involves helping with electoral mobilization, attending rallies or campaign events, monitoring elections, and transforming public services and administrative procedures into clientelistic exchanges (Oliveros, 2016a(Oliveros, , 2016bStokes, Dunning, Nazareno, & Brusco, 2013;WeitzShapiro, 2014;Zarazaga, 2014). 7 In clientelist agreements, political patrons may reciprocate such services with goods or favors for bureaucrats -including jobs, pay rises, promotions, favorable transfers, and protection from dismissal.…”

Section: Hypothesis 2 (H2)mentioning

confidence: 99%

Merit, Tenure, and Bureaucratic Behavior: Evidence From a Conjoint Experiment in the Dominican Republic

Oliveros

Schuster

2017

Comparative Political Studies

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Bureaucratic behavior in developing countries remains poorly understood. Why do some public servants -yet not others -work hard to deliver public services, misuse state resources, and/or participate in electoral mobilization? A classic answer comes from Weber: bureaucratic structures shift behavior towards integrity, neutrality, and commitment to public service. Our paper conducts the first survey experimental test of the effects of bureaucratic structures. It does so through a conjoint experiment with public servants in the Dominican Republic. Looking at merit examinations and job stability, we find that Weber was right -but only partially. Recruitment by examination curbs corruption and political services by bureaucrats, while enhancing work motivation. Job stability, by contrast, only decreases political services: tenured bureaucrats are less likely to participate in electoral mobilization. Examinations thus enhance the quality of bureaucracy (motivation and lower corruption) and democracy (electoral competition); job stability only enhances the quality of democracy. Forthcoming in Comparative Political Studies

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Section: Hypothesis 2 (H2)mentioning

confidence: 99%

Merit, Tenure, and Bureaucratic Behavior: Evidence From a Conjoint Experiment in the Dominican Republic

Oliveros

Schuster

2017

Comparative Political Studies

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“…6 We assume that there is a strong connection between the scope of malapportionment and the pervasiveness of nonprogrammatic forms of political exchange (Soares 1973;Stokes et al 2013;Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007). Based on these three premises and using the preferences laid out in Figure 2, we analyze the process of preference aggregation and the formation of possible political coalitions.…”

Section: From Preferences To Outcomes: Inequality Representation Anmentioning

confidence: 99%

Barriers to Egalitarianism: Distributive Tensions in Latin American Federations

Beramendi

Rogers

Díaz-Cayeros

2022

Lat. American Res. Rev.

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Latin America's largest federations have significantly reduced their levels of income inequality in recent years, perhaps reflecting a structural change toward egalitarianism. However, we argue that the political geography of federalism in Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico strongly shapes preferences against centralized redistribution likely to promote equity in the long term. While federalism does not necessary lead to lower redistribution in theory, the geographic spread of income and malapportioned political institutions limit egalitarianism in these nations. These dynamics help explain why fiscal structures are distinct in Latin American federations as compared to federations in high-income countries. First, we show that the territorial structure of inequality and malapportionment are associated with lower redistributive effort in the global context and that the Latin American federations have extreme values for both variables. Second, using a new data set of income distributions within and across Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico over time, we demonstrate that the conditions that favor fiscal transfers from the national to subnational governments are consistently strong, but conditions are rarely favorable for centralized policies to equilibrate national income. Unequal income patterns are reinforced by legislative malapportionment, which encourages interregional transfers to regions and limits the political voice of more populated and unequal regions that would benefit from centralized redistribution.Las federaciones más grandes de América Latina han reducido significativamente sus niveles de desigualdad de ingresos en los últimos años, lo que quizás refleja un cambio estructural hacia el igualitarismo. Sin embargo, este estudio argumenta que la geografía política del federalismo en Argentina, Brasil y México moldea fuertemente las preferencias en contra de la redistribución centralizada que promueve la equidad a largo plazo. Aunque, en teoría, el federalismo no necesariamente reduce la redistribución, la distribución geográfica de los ingresos y la representación desproporcionada de las instituciones políticas limitan el igualitarismo en eses países. Estas dinámicas ayudan a explicar las estructuras fiscales son distintas en las federaciones de América Latina en comparación con las federaciones de países desarrollados. Primero, se muestra que una estructura territorial de desigualdad y la inadecuada distribución política están asociadas con un menor esfuerzo redistributivo en un contexto global y que las federaciones de América Latina tienen valores extremos de ambas variables. Segundo, utilizando una nueva base de datos sobre la distribución dentro y a través de las regiones de Argentina, Brasil y México a lo largo del tiempo, se demuestra que las condiciones que favorecen las transferencias fiscales desde el nivel nacional a los gobiernos subnacionales son consistentemente propicias, pero las condiciones son raramente favorables para que las políticas centralizadas equilibren los ingresos nacionales. Patrones d...

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“…Greater incomes tend to coincide with lower future discount rates, with voters more willing to forego immediate private goods receipts in the form of patronage in favour of longer-term public goods benefits through reform (Charron & Lapuente, 2010). Similarly, higher incomes reduce voters' risk aversion and thus enhance their willingness to forego a certain private goods benefit in favour of a probabilistic public goods benefit (Stokes, Dunning, Nazareno, & Brusco, 2013).…”

Section: )mentioning

confidence: 99%

When the Victor Cannot Claim the Spoils: Institutional Incentives for Professionalizing Patronage States

Schuster

2016

SSRN Journal

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In most of the world's states, bureaucrats are managed based on patronage: political discretion determines recruitment and careers. Corruption, poverty and lower growth often result. Unsurprisingly, patronage reform has taken centre stage in foreign aid.Yet, reforms overwhelmingly fail. Bad government is often good politics. When does good government become good politics in patronage states?To address this conundrum, this dissertation develops and tests a theory of reform of

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Brokers, Voters, and Clientelism

Cited by 1,014 publications

References 1 publication

Merit, Tenure, and Bureaucratic Behavior: Evidence From a Conjoint Experiment in the Dominican Republic

Merit, Tenure, and Bureaucratic Behavior: Evidence From a Conjoint Experiment in the Dominican Republic

Barriers to Egalitarianism: Distributive Tensions in Latin American Federations

When the Victor Cannot Claim the Spoils: Institutional Incentives for Professionalizing Patronage States

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