Buddhist Backgrounds of the Burmese Revolution

Cady, John F.; Sarkisyanz, E.

doi:10.1007/978-94-017-6283-0

Cited by 132 publications

(24 citation statements)

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“…16 These monks advocated Buddhist socialism as a political condition for spiritual pursuit in the world, and this led them to be remembered as outstanding figures in the fight for Independence by many Burmese. 17 Building on these cases, Sarkisyanz (1965) shows how strongly Burmese political ideas rest on Buddhist ideology; this was true in the 1960s as it has been in the 1990s (Houtman 1999). Like the Ledi abbot, U Ottama, U Wisara and others emphasized in their teachings the possibility of salvation for laypeople-a shift from the view during royal rule, when it was reserved to monkhood.…”

Section: The Ambiguity Of Preaching As a Religious Deedmentioning

confidence: 92%

The ‘Frying Pan’ Abbot: the Rise and Fall of a Burmese Preaching Monk

Perrière

2015

Contemporary Buddhism

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Section: The Ambiguity Of Preaching As a Religious Deedmentioning

confidence: 92%

The ‘Frying Pan’ Abbot: the Rise and Fall of a Burmese Preaching Monk

Perrière

2015

Contemporary Buddhism

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“…The consequence for a ruler is to concentrate in himself as much power as possible and become a universal ruler. This entails the belief that the ruler's court is the centre of the universe (McCloud 1995: 74), a belief that finds its ultimate form in the Buddhist cakravartin concept (Sarkisyanz 1965). The cakravartin was a universal ruler and, though in principle a benevolent king, the fact that virtually every aspiring ruler in Theravada Buddhist mainland Southeast Asia claimed to be a cakravartin was a major source of warfare in Southeast Asia's early phases of modernity.…”

Section: Historical-cultural Legacies Of Asean Cooperationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Decoupling rhetoric and practice: the cultural limits of ASEAN cooperation

Jetschke

Rüland

2009

The Pacific Review

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Why have ASEAN member states declared and why do they continue to declare their intention to enhance cooperation and devise projects when implementation lags behind their rhetoric? Why do they rhetorically commit themselves to cooperation, when they continue to stick to self-interested policies to the detriment of ASEAN's collective interest? And given these diverging practices, how likely is it that the objective of a more legalized and binding cooperation associated with the recently ratified ASEAN Charter is being implemented? This article draws attention to ASEAN's hybrid or dual character of international cooperation, consisting of the emulation of the European integration project and the persistence of deeper cultural strata of Southeast Asia's cooperation project that determine the limits of cooperation: Southeast Asia's social structure and political culture that have not produced those mechanisms that might facilitate international cooperation. If our explanation is correct that cooperation within ASEAN comes about as a simultaneous process of emulation and established cultural practices, we expect change only under specified conditions. Based on our argument and the theoretical literature on normative change, we identify and discuss in greater detail three potential outcomes of change: inertia, localization and transformation. The three modes make different predictions concerning change within ASEAN. Based on an analysis of the two major shocks with which ASEAN has had to contend in the last two decades,

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“…e Bamar race is viewed as representing the epitome of a civilized race and culture (Boutry 2015). e Myanmar government's policy of Burmanisation, initiated by General Ne Win, stresses the racial purity and supremacy of the Burmans who are Buddhist by faith (Sarkisyanz 1965).…”

Section: Face 1: Burmese Race Based Religious Nationalism and The Makmentioning

confidence: 99%

Three Faces of the Rohingya Crisis: Religious Nationalism, Asian Islamophobia, and Delegitimizing Citizenship

Yusuf

2018

sdi

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Myanmar is a non-secular Buddhist majority country born out of the ashes of the murder of their leader of independence struggle, General Aung San, was assassinated on July 19, 1947, a few months before the independence of Burma on January 4, 1948. His failed legacy in integrating Myanmar into a multicultural nation which contains of Burmans as ethnic majority and non-Burman minorities continues to obsess Myanmar’s people. The Rohingya crisis is not a religious conflict between Islam and Buddhism because both of them have a long-shared history of peaceful coexistence. Furthermore, it is also not only a case of Buddhist persecution against Muslims as recognized by the Rohingyan nationalists. Actually, it is a clash between two views of nationalism over the claim to Myanmar citizenship. The conflict invokes Buddhist and Muslim nationalist in order to protect and preserve national ethnicities as religious identities in turn causing the rise of the new phenomena of Asian Islamophobia.

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Buddhist Backgrounds of the Burmese Revolution

Cited by 132 publications

References 0 publications

The ‘Frying Pan’ Abbot: the Rise and Fall of a Burmese Preaching Monk

The ‘Frying Pan’ Abbot: the Rise and Fall of a Burmese Preaching Monk

Decoupling rhetoric and practice: the cultural limits of ASEAN cooperation

Three Faces of the Rohingya Crisis: Religious Nationalism, Asian Islamophobia, and Delegitimizing Citizenship

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