Building a model of supply chains duopoly taking into account the marketing and innovative activities of manufacturing enterprises

Abstract

This paper reports the construction and analysis of the economic and mathematical model of the duopoly of supply chains, based on the model of optimization of plans for the release and delivery of multi-range articles, taking into consideration the marketing and innovative activities of industrial enterprises. Demand for goods is supposed to be an increasing function of advertising costs. In this case, marketing investments affect only the base selling prices of articles and do not affect competitive discounts. The explicit form of this dependence can be established as a result of marketing research. It is also assumed that investments in innovative technological projects could reduce industrial costs; production costs are decreasing functions of the size of the investment. It is believed that the demand function is linearly dependent on the total volume of output produced. The criterion of optimality for supply chains is the maximum of the total profit received from the sale and delivery of finished products to points of consumption, taking into consideration the costs of production and advertising. As a result of this study, equilibrium solutions of the duopoly according to Cournot and Stackelberg were found. That has made it possible to determine the optimal values of product volumes for output, the size of investment investments, as well as product advertising costs. The model helped study the impact of investment deductions and advertising costs on the acquisition of competitive advantages by manufacturing enterprises. A numerical illustration of the results obtained is given. The proposed approach could be used to build and analyze dynamic optimization models taking into consideration the innovation and marketing activities of enterprises, as well as to study other market structures

Coordinating a dual-channel supply chain with pricing and extended warranty strategies under demand substitution effects

“…Meanwhile, in online channel m, manufacturer M directly sells products to end customers via its online platform. Following the Stackelberg game, manufacturer M becomes the game's leader, whereas retailer R becomes the follower [11,17]. The manufacturer M provides a wholesale price w r to retailer R and an extended warranty length t r to customers in offline channel r. Afterward, retailer R offers a retail price p r to customers.…”

“…Regarding channel management, scholars have conducted several analyses from the perspective of the manufacturer and retailer on channel decision-making and coordination to minimize the competition effect. They typically adopt mathematical models and game theory to propose a feasible coordination contract, achieve a win-win situation, such as wholesale price, buyback contract, and revenue, and cost sharing contracts [11][12][13][14]. Work [12] studied the decision-making and coordination under customer preferences for a dual-channel supply chain consisting of a manufacturer and an e-commerce platform.…”

Hierarchic change system dynamics supply chain model: impact of demand information sharing on holding cost and downstream project completion

“…Information sharing may include sharing point-of-sale, delivery schedules, inventory level, and demand information. Interactions and relationships between system components and their behavior are also essential in complex systems to improve performance [8] and gain a competitive advantage [9]. Thus, any improvement can be carried out systemically and thoroughly.…”