Building Subnational Debt Markets in Developing and Transition Economies: A Framework for Analysis, Policy Reform, and Assistance Strategy

Noël, Michel

doi:10.1596/1813-9450-2339

Cited by 11 publications

(6 citation statements)

References 0 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…The moral hazard problem would not exist if central governments could credibly commit to no ex-post changes in the allocation of transfers, that is, to a no-bailout policy (Hernández-Trillo, Cayeros, González 2002, Goodspeed 2002. However, it is difficult to achieve such a commitment (Wildasin 1997;Persson and Tabellini 1996;Noel 2000;Bordignon, Manasse, Tabellini 2001).…”

Section: Moral Hazardmentioning

confidence: 99%

How Well Do Subnational Borrowing Regulations Work?

Martínez-Vázquez

Vulovic²

2016

SSRN Journal

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

The views expressed in this paper are the views of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views or policies of ADBI, ADB, its Board of Directors, or the governments they represent. ADBI does not guarantee the accuracy of the data included in this paper and accepts no responsibility for any consequences of their use. Terminology used may not necessarily be consistent with ADB official terms. Working papers are subject to formal revision and correction before they are finalized and considered published.

show abstract

Section: Moral Hazardmentioning

confidence: 99%

How Well Do Subnational Borrowing Regulations Work?

Martínez-Vázquez

Vulovic²

2016

SSRN Journal

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…The trend towards decentralized structures in developing countries continues. [9][10][11][12][13][14][15][16][17][18] Ideally, municipal ''borrowing is an appropriate source of capital for those services which involve investment in long-lasting infrastructure, which is the case particularly for public utilities and roads.'' [5][6][7][8] The research on long-term financing arrangements for and by municipalities in developing countries is only recently making its way into mainstream academic literature.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Municipal Investment, Borrowing, and Pricing Under Decentralization: The Brazilian Case

Martell

2003

International Journal of Public Administration

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Very few researchers have addressed the long-term financing arrangements of municipal governments in developing countries. No research has evaluated empirically either the elements that affect municipal borrowing in developing countries or what those elements reveal about the municipal credit system. Analyzing Brazilian municipal loan and financial data with a series of simultaneous equations, this paper addresses the following questions: What factors determine municipal government investment levels, borrowing levels, and borrowing prices? What do empirical data reveal about the character of the Brazilian municipal credit system? The results show that investment, borrowing, and borrowing prices are interconnected. Furthermore, while some signs of a market-based system exist, there is evidence that investment and borrowing decisions are made within an administered market.

show abstract

“…However, it is difficult to achieve such a commitment (Wildasin 1997;Persson and Tabellini 1996;Noel 2000;Bordignon, Manasse, Tabellini 2001).…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

How Well Do Subnational Borrowing Regulations Work?

Martínez-Vázquez

Vulovic²

2016

SSRN Journal

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Terms of use: Documents in Asian Development Bank InstituteThe Working Paper series is a continuation of the formerly named Discussion Paper series; the numbering of the papers continued without interruption or change. ADBI's working papers reflect initial ideas on a topic and are posted online for discussion. ADBI encourages readers to post their comments on the main page for each working paper (given in the citation below). Some working papers may develop into other forms of publication. The authors are grateful to Yasin Civelek for his excellent research assistance.The views expressed in this paper are the views of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views or policies of ADBI, ADB, its Board of Directors, or the governments they represent. ADBI does not guarantee the accuracy of the data included in this paper and accepts no responsibility for any consequences of their use. Terminology used may not necessarily be consistent with ADB official terms.Working papers are subject to formal revision and correction before they are finalized and considered published.Asian Development Bank Institute Kasumigaseki Building 8F 3-2-5 Kasumigaseki, Chiyoda-ku Tokyo 100-6008, JapanTel:+81-3-3593-5500 Fax:+81-3-3593-5571 URL:www.adbi.org E-mail: info@adbi.org AbstractThere are many positive aspects associated with subnational borrowing, including additional funding and promoting intergenerational equity. However, it may also endanger fiscal sustainability and macro stability due to moral hazard and soft budget constraints, making borrowing controls justified and common. This study reviews the different types of ex-ante and ex-post subnational borrowing regulations used in the international experience based on a large panel of developed and developing countries. Each type of regulations has advantages and disadvantages, with varying suitability to a country's circumstances.It is found that the presence of subnational tax autonomy contributes to an increase in the general government primary balance but not significantly for subnational primary balances. A history of subnational bailouts is associated with lower primary balances, on average, at all levels. The "golden rule" and limits on debt and borrowing appear effective at all levels of government. However, none of the broad types of subnational borrowing regulations seem to have a distinct significant direct effect on the narrow definition of fiscal sustainability at the subnational level.

show abstract

Building Subnational Debt Markets in Developing and Transition Economies: A Framework for Analysis, Policy Reform, and Assistance Strategy

Cited by 11 publications

References 0 publications

How Well Do Subnational Borrowing Regulations Work?

How Well Do Subnational Borrowing Regulations Work?

Municipal Investment, Borrowing, and Pricing Under Decentralization: The Brazilian Case

How Well Do Subnational Borrowing Regulations Work?

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About