Bundled Rebates as Exclusion Rather Than Predation

Abstract

for questions and comments at a July 19, 2006 discussion hosted by eSapience. Thanks for useful comments go also to Luke Froeb, Alex Rascovitch,Tom Ross, and Richard Taylor. None of the above necessarily agrees with my opinions-I am confident that many do not-and responsibility for errors and omissions rests solely with me.

Ahead of His Time: The Singular Contributions of Richard Markovits

“…28 The typical way this would be done would be by cornering the market in the input or complement; exclusive dealing contracts or loyalty rebate programs could be a way to do that. 29 A special case could be a firm that nominally sells an input or complement at a regulated price, but can effectively raise that price to rivals through impeding ability to acquire the regulated product in a timely matter without degradation of quality. 30 The crucial error Prof. Markovits identifies is that if the cause is the creation of economic power (or evasion of regulatory constraint) in an input or complement market, focusing on the primary market puts the eye on the wrong ball.…”

“High-Tech” Antitrust: Incoherent, Misguided, Obsolete, or None of the Above? Comments on Crandall-Jackson and Wright

“…20 An increased likelihood of enforcement makes them worse off, not better off. Figure 1, adapted from Brennan (2008), illustrates how these exclusionary practices work. Suppose that the alleged monopolist, here Intel, has deals with three leading personal computer (PC) manufacturers.…”

Network Effects in Infrastructure Regulation: Principles and Paradoxes

“…Brennan (2008a). If the Premier League should have the ability to market TV rights collectively, this argument disappears.…”

“…3 A competitive analysis of exclusive dealing is not addressed here; for more, see Brennan (2007Brennan ( , 2008a. However, the open vs. proprietary debate is related to network interconnection policy, addressed below at more length.…”