Bureaucratic manoeuvres and the local politics of climate change mitigation in China and India

Abstract

This article explores how strategies of thinking and working politically are used by agencies within developing country governments to influence wider government agendas. It uses research on climate change mitigation in China and India to explore how government agencies seek to overcome challenges of limited capacity and competing priorities by bundling climate change together with more immediate priorities and thereby developing a coalition with an interest in achieving these objectives. The article is based on interviews conducted in China and India, as well as analysis of themes covered in the growing body of literature on the domestic politics of climate change mitigation. In both countries we found that pragmatic approaches leveraging what already exists made significant progress in putting energy efficiency on the agenda, strengthening institutional presence (in India) and delivering improvements in energy efficiency (in China). Yet, we also found that the use of these tactics had significant limitations. While there was probably no other way that the policy space given to climate change mitigation could have increased so rapidly, there are significant side effects that arise as a result of the traction gained by these initial policy approaches. While bundling raised the profile of energy efficiency, it also created perverse incentives that highlight the need to consider the long‐term effect on the interests, capacity and sustainability of informal coalitions. We highlight the need to take account of both the short‐ and long‐term effects of thinking and working politically, and the challenges of doing so when the outcomes are unpredictable and inherently difficult to assess.

Superimposition: How Indian city bureaucracies are responding to climate change

“…Such 'co-benefits' have been identified as crucial in motivating climate action as they bring with them immediate benefits, such as development or welfare, which local actors are familiar with and directly benefit from. In addition, local actors are more likely to have entrenched incentives to address these "co-benefits" to climate action, therefore leading to the sustained occurrence of actors "bundling" local concerns and immediate priorities with climate mitigation and adaptation objectives (Aggarwal, 2013;Cook and Chu, 2018;Harrison and Kostka, 2018;Koehn, 2008). This bundling is of particular relevance to decision-makers in the global South who are seeking to find ways to respond to climate change, but whose development and welfare concerns can overwhelm explicit climate objectives (Bhardwaj et al, 2019).…”

“…As case studies of climate action have shown, identifying 'win-wins' between development and climate change can motivate responses (Fisher, 2012;Khosla and Bhardwaj, 2018). However, actions to simultaneously address climate and existing objectives, with entrenched practices, need not always be win-win, and can create perverse incentives, or reinforce unjust planning, development, and decision-making practices (Chu, 2018;Harrison and Kostka, 2018).…”

Who Drives Climate-relevant Policy Implementation in China?

“…As more data and cases are reported, there is wider acceptance of the complexity of the climate policymaking process and its implementation. Unlike oversimplified models of topdown or bottom-up decision making, Harrison and Kostka (2012) found the power of bargaining and collaboration between the local and central government:…”

“…The first set of challenges was due to the divergence between the priorities of the sub-national and national government (or local-central relationship). Although the national government was responsible for mainstreaming climate change mitigation and adaptation into the national development strategy, it was the sub-national government or local government that would turn these national policies into reality (Harrison and Kostka 2012;Teng 2012). The conflict between the two is hardly news.…”

“…Beyond highlighting the complexity of the implementation process, this report also suggests the dynamic evolution of interests over time. Similar to the description of Harrison and Kostka (2012) in section 5.3.2, temporary coalitions or alliances are formed in order to fulfil the evolving interests of the different stakeholders. In each case, the degree to which the multiple stakeholders find similar interests (or not) leads to the formation of a coalition (or not).…”