Bureaucrats Versus Voters: On the Political Economy of Resource Allocation by Direct Democracy

Römer, Thomas; Rosenthal, Howard

doi:10.2307/1884470

Cited by 464 publications

(237 citation statements)

References 2 publications

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“…8 It is well known that a budget maximizing agenda setter can achieve higher spending than preferred by the median voter Rosenthal, 1979 andRomer et al, 1992). Since school boards propose budgets, this result is potentially relevant to NYSTAR.…”

Section: Conceptual Frameworkmentioning

confidence: 99%

Local response to fiscal incentives in heterogeneous communities

Rockoff¹

2010

Journal of Urban Economics

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Section: Conceptual Frameworkmentioning

confidence: 99%

Local response to fiscal incentives in heterogeneous communities

Rockoff¹

2010

Journal of Urban Economics

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“…The voter prefers and will approve this alternative, making the voter and the governor both better off. As shown by Romer and Rosenthal (1979), the governor would not be so accommodating to the voter as to choose V x = , however.…”

Section: Checks and Balancesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Direct Democracy and the Executive Branch

Matsusaka¹

2008

Direct Democracy’s Impact on American Political Institutions

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This paper examines the impact of direct democracy on the executive branch. Direct democracy is a mixed blessing for the executive in theory: it weakens the legislature by cutting it out of the lawmaking process, but also allows new laws to avoid the governor's veto. Empirically, the constitutional initiative is associated with several changes in the organization of the executive branch, including term limits and lower salaries. By taking away the government's ability to set policy on some issues, the initiative permits citizens to target their votes more narrowly when the governor stands for re-election, providing stronger incentives for good performance. Some evidence from gubernatorial elections over suggests that voter sanctions are stronger when the initiative is available.

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“…Gazey (1971) argues that legislators will use the referendum to "pass the buck" to the electorate on tax increases to avoid politically difficult decisions. This finding is similar to Romer and Rosenthal's (1979) model of agenda setting where politicians use the referendum for budget maximization. However, if referendum use is driven by a mix of policy goals and political motivations, legislators should be constrained in their ability to use the process.…”

Section: Direct Legislation and Agenda Settingsupporting

confidence: 77%

Selection and Passage of County Land Preservation Voter Referendum: The Role of Government

Beaghen¹

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Bureaucrats Versus Voters: On the Political Economy of Resource Allocation by Direct Democracy

Cited by 464 publications

References 2 publications

Local response to fiscal incentives in heterogeneous communities

Local response to fiscal incentives in heterogeneous communities

Direct Democracy and the Executive Branch

Selection and Passage of County Land Preservation Voter Referendum: The Role of Government

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