Direct Democracy and the Executive Branch

Abstract

This paper examines the impact of direct democracy on the executive branch. Direct democracy is a mixed blessing for the executive in theory: it weakens the legislature by cutting it out of the lawmaking process, but also allows new laws to avoid the governor's veto. Empirically, the constitutional initiative is associated with several changes in the organization of the executive branch, including term limits and lower salaries. By taking away the government's ability to set policy on some issues, the initiative permits citizens to target their votes more narrowly when the governor stands for re-election, providing stronger incentives for good performance. Some evidence from gubernatorial elections over suggests that voter sanctions are stronger when the initiative is available.

Does direct democracy make for better citizens? A cautionary warning based on cross-country evidence

“…It cannot be excluded that better informed citizens display less trust as the higher level of information gives them little reason to trust politicians. Matsusaka (2008) develops an argument to the contrary, hypothesizing that citizens, by removing contentious issues from their representatives, might perceive an improved ability to control them regarding the remaining issues. This could, in turn, be connected with a higher level of trust.…”

Referendum and the choice between monarchy and republic in Greece

“…This argument is of obvious relevance in cases where authoritarian rulers under restrictions on freedom and rigged ballots exploit the referendum process to give the pursuit of their objectives a semblance of democracy. On the other hand, Matsusaka (2008) offers a subtler and previously unrecognized argument in favour of direct democracy, as well as some suggestive evidence. Namely, by deciding some issues directly and therefore removing them from the domain of elected officials, the referendum enables voters to sanction politicians more effectively even on the issues that remain under their control forcing them to improve their performance and be more faithful agents.…”

“…Focusing on the opportunity that referendums offer to unbundle issues, Besley and Coate (2008) develop a model where initiatives are a mechanism to select those candidates for public office whose preferences will produce the outcome congruent with the preferences of the voters. Matsusaka (2008) considers the initiative as an incentive mechanism to force politicians to implement their promised policies in the interest of voters. These studies focus on the voter-politician representation relationship and the delegation problems involved.…”

The voter initiative and the power of the governor: evidence from campaign expenditures

“…While the state legislature is generally considered to relinquish decision making authority when the voter initiative is available, there has been little investigation into the impact of the voter initiative process on the state executive branch. Matsusaka (2008) explores the effects of the voter initiative on the relative policy influence of the median voter, legislative branch, and executive branch in states in the U.S. He uses a simple model that employs singlepeaked preferences to examine policy outcomes.…”

“…The availability of the voter initiative process can potentially alter the policymaking dynamic. Matsusaka (2008) provides the first attempt to examine the effects of the voter initiative on the relative influence of the median voter, the legislature, and the executive branch. He uses a simple model similar to Gerber (1996) and Matsusaka and McCarty (2001) in which all actors have single-peaked preferences.…”