“…The implementation of the common monetary policy, the institutional structure of the EU, and the strong linkages between European countries, may have forced politicians to relinquish their ability to generate partisan cycles, and left them with no other choice but to manipulate fiscal policy when elections approached. Arguably, the existence of national electoral-fiscal cycles can account, to some extent, for the considerable cross-country differences in policy instrument interdependencies ( van Aarle, Garretsen, & Gobbin, 2003), and be seen as one of the factors that prevents complete economic integration (see Bailey & Choi, 2003) and greater synchronization of business cycles (Papageorgiou, Michaelides, & Milios, 2010) across the EMU member states. Furthermore, the incentives for politicians to adopt politically motivated fiscal policies (which partly explains the failure of several countries to abide by the spirit of the Stability and Growth Pact) can account for volatilities in the euro's external value.…”