Bypassing the ‘ratification straitjacket’: reviewing US legal participation in a climate agreement

Kemp, Luke

doi:10.1080/14693062.2015.1061472

Cited by 19 publications

(10 citation statements)

References 39 publications

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“…Parties who refuse to yield to the outcomes of voting on these issues could simply ''opt-out'' of that protocol. I have previously outlined how such a form of CMG could allow for an agreement with US legal pariticpation through presidential agreements on different protocols and avoid the need for Senate or Congressional approval (Kemp 2015). Thus CMG can provide a flexible and effective approach that resolves the conundrum of US legal participation.…”

Section: Effectiveness: Critical Mass Governancementioning

confidence: 97%

Framework for the future? Exploring the possibility of majority voting in the climate negotiations

Kemp

2015

Int Environ Agreements

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The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) is struggling in its attempts to address the threat of anthropogenic climate change and create an effective international climate agreement. A substantial part of the problem is consensus decision-making within the Convention. Majority voting is a potential alternative which is already being discussed within the UNFCCC. A comparative analysis of consensus and majority voting suggests that majority voting is superior in terms of both efficiency and effectiveness by allowing for quicker decision-making and semi-global approaches to a climate agreement (termed here as ''Critical Mass Governance''). This paper aims to investigate how majority voting could be implemented in the UNFCCC and to consider politically feasible and effective approaches to voting arrangements for the Convention. There is a legal opportunity to introduce voting through adoption of the draft Rules of Procedure, but this faces political opposition. A type of Layered Majority Voting with larger majorities for financial and substantial matters is considered to be the optimal approach in balancing political feasibility and effectiveness. For now, voting is not politically feasible for the UNFCCC, but could be introduced into future bodies or treaties under the Convention.

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Section: Effectiveness: Critical Mass Governancementioning

confidence: 97%

Framework for the future? Exploring the possibility of majority voting in the climate negotiations

Kemp

2015

Int Environ Agreements

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“…International climate policy has always been controversial within the US Kemp, 2016Kemp, , 2017. For example, the George H.W.…”

Section: The Us and Climate Policymentioning

confidence: 99%

The effectiveness of climate clubs under Donald Trump

et al. 2017

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On 1 June 2017, President Trump announced that the US intends to leave the Paris Agreement if no alternative terms acceptable to his administration can be agreed upon. In this article, an agent-based model of bottom-up climate mitigation clubs is used to derive the impact that lack of US participation may have on the membership of such clubs and their emissions coverage. We systematically analyse the prospects for climate mitigation clubs, depending on which of three conceivable roles the US takes on: as a leader (for benchmarking), as a follower (i.e. willing to join climate mitigation clubs initiated by others if this is in its best interest) or as an outsider (i.e. staying outside of any climate mitigation club no matter what). We investigate these prospects for three types of incentives for becoming a member: club goods, conditional commitments and side-payments. Our results show that lack of US leadership significantly constrains climate clubs' potential. Lack of US willingness to follow others' lead is an additional, but smaller constraint. Only in a few cases will US withdrawal entail widespread departures by other countries. We conclude that climate mitigation clubs can function without the participation of an important GHG emitter, given that other major emitters show leadership, although these clubs will rarely cover more than 50% of global emissions. Key policy insights. The US switching from being a leader to being a follower substantially reduces the emissions coverage of climate mitigation clubs. . The US switching from being a follower to being an outsider sometimes reduces coverage further, but has a smaller impact than the switch from leader to follower. . The switch from follower to outsider only occasionally results in widespread departures by other countries; in a few instances it even entices others to join. . Climate mitigation clubs can function even without the participation of the US, provided that other major emitters show leadership; however, such clubs will typically be unable to cover more than 50% of global emissions. . Climate mitigation clubs may complement the Paris Agreement and can also serve as an alternative in case Paris fails. ARTICLE HISTORY

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“…It signed onto the Copenhagen Accord of 2009 and the Paris Agreement of 2015, while also presenting voluntary pledges to reduce emissions. Yet, the idiosyncrasies of the US political system have continued to hamper efforts to reassert US climate leadership (Kemp, 2016;Paterson, 2009), pushing the Obama administration to pursue less traditional political strategies in climate policy (Bang & Schreurs, 2016;Skodvin & Andresen, 2009). The US showed it can rapidly reduce its emissions, even without agreeing to binding emission reduction targets.…”

Section: Us Climate Leadership Under Obamamentioning

confidence: 99%

“…3 This article provides a contribution to the proliferating and important literature on US non-cooperation in environmental policy. A key point across this literature is that US non-cooperation is largely a structural issue, related to the particularities of the US political system, which make it hard for US presidents to adopt environmental regulations or ratify multilateral agreements (Bang, Hovi, & Sprinz, 2012;Depledge, 2005;DeSombre, 2000;Kemp, 2016). Most of these studies date from before the election of Trump and his formal decision to withdraw from the Paris Agreement.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

United States non-cooperation and the Paris agreement

Urpelainen

Graaf

2017

Climate Policy

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In June 2017, the Trump administration decided to withdraw the US from the Paris Agreement, a landmark climate agreement adopted in 2015 by 195 nations. The exit of the US has not just raised concern that the US will miss its domestic emission reduction targets, but also that other parties to the Paris Agreement might backtrack on their initial pledges regarding emission reductions or financial contributions. Here we assess the magnitude of the threat that US non-cooperation poses to the Paris Agreement from an international relations perspective. We argue that US non-cooperation does not fundamentally alter US emissions, which are unlikely to rise even in the absence of new federal climate policies. Nor does it undermine nationally determined contributions under pledge and review, as the Paris Agreement has introduced a new logic of domestically driven climate policies and the cost of low-carbon technologies keeps falling. However, US nonparticipation in raising climate finance could raise high barriers to global climate cooperation in the future. Political strategies to mitigate these threats include direct engagement by climate leaders such as the European Union with key emerging economies, notably China and India, and domestic climate policies that furnish benefits to traditional opponents of ambitious climate policy. Key policy insights. US non-cooperation need not be a major threat to pledge and review under the Paris Agreement.. US non-cooperation is a serious threat to climate finance.. Deeper engagement with emerging economies offers new opportunities for global climate policy.

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Bypassing the ‘ratification straitjacket’: reviewing US legal participation in a climate agreement

Cited by 19 publications

References 39 publications

Framework for the future? Exploring the possibility of majority voting in the climate negotiations

Framework for the future? Exploring the possibility of majority voting in the climate negotiations

The effectiveness of climate clubs under Donald Trump

United States non-cooperation and the Paris agreement

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