Proceedings of the 2016 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security 2016
DOI: 10.1145/2976749.2978358
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C-Flat

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Cited by 198 publications
(63 citation statements)
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“…Therefore, it does not detect the malware presence between system calls, and it does not check the runtime flow of the instructions of a specific module. C-FLAT [10] proposes a complete attestation of the run-time state of the Prover. During the execution, each software instruction is reported into a so-called "trusted anchor" and from there, a hash engine mechanism accumulates the sequence of the instructions into a single hash value that represents the entire control flow of the Prover's state.…”
Section: Related Workmentioning
confidence: 99%
See 3 more Smart Citations
“…Therefore, it does not detect the malware presence between system calls, and it does not check the runtime flow of the instructions of a specific module. C-FLAT [10] proposes a complete attestation of the run-time state of the Prover. During the execution, each software instruction is reported into a so-called "trusted anchor" and from there, a hash engine mechanism accumulates the sequence of the instructions into a single hash value that represents the entire control flow of the Prover's state.…”
Section: Related Workmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The attestation of data memory of individual devices requires the execution of a single-device attestation protocol that detects subverted control flows. One possible example of such attestation protocol is C-FLAT [10]. In the case the device is not compromised, a control-flow attestation protocol, running on a single device, will report the benign state of the device.…”
Section: Problem Settingmentioning
confidence: 99%
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“…[Ferguson and Gu 2011] implements control flow protection in the context of WSNs; however, the described scheme has not been combined with any attestation mechanism. Control-Flow ATtestation (C-FLAT) [Abera et al 2016] is a similar, but different, approach. Instead of embedding code to protect the authentic application flow, it embeds code to monitor its execution path.…”
Section: Time Of Check To Time Of Usementioning
confidence: 99%