Research in the field of hardware Trojans has seen significant growth in the past decade. However, standard benchmarks to evaluate hardware Trojans and their detection are lacking. To this end, we have developed a suite of Trojans and 'trust benchmarks' (i.e., benchmark circuits with a hardware Trojan inserted in them) that can be used by researchers in the community to compare and contrast various Trojan detection techniques. In this paper, we present a comprehensive vulnerability analysis flow at various levels of abstraction of digital-design, that has been utilized to create these trust benchmarks. Further, we present a detailed evaluation of our benchmarks in terms of metrics such as Trojan detectability, and in the context of different attack

The reverse engineering (RE) of electronic chips and systems can be used with honest and dishonest intentions. To inhibit RE for those with dishonest intentions (e.g., piracy and counterfeiting), it is important that the community is aware of the state-of-the-art capabilities available to attackers today. In this article, we will be presenting a survey of RE and anti-RE techniques on the chip, board, and system levels. We also highlight the current challenges and limitations of anti-RE and the research needed to overcome them. This survey should be of interest to both governmental and industrial bodies whose critical systems and intellectual property (IP) require protection from foreign enemies and counterfeiters who possess advanced RE capabilities.

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Given the increasing complexity of modern electronics and the cost of fabrication, entities from around the globe have become more heavily involved in all phases of the electronics supply chain. In this environment, hardware Trojans (i.e., malicious modifications or inclusions made by untrusted third parties) pose major security concerns, especially for those integrated circuits (ICs) and systems used in critical applications and cyber infrastructure. While hardware Trojans have been explored significantly in academia over the last decade, there remains room for improvement. In this article, we examine the research on hardware Trojans from the last decade and attempt to capture the lessons learned. A comprehensive adversarial model taxonomy is introduced and used to examine the current state of the art. Then the past countermeasures and publication trends are categorized based on the adversarial model and topic. Through this analysis, we identify what has been covered and the important problems that are underinvestigated. We also identify the most critical lessons for those new to the field and suggest a roadmap for future hardware Trojan research.