2014
DOI: 10.1260/0958-305x.25.3-4.551
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California's Cap-and-Trade Programme and Insights for China's Pilot Schemes

Abstract: California's cap-and-trade programme under the Assembly Bill 32 is a key element in California's comprehensive plan for reducing its greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions to 1990 levels by 2020. In China, separate local cap-and-trade pilot schemes are being developed to explore a market-based solution for addressing the country's increasing GHG emissions. The Californian cap-and-trade scheme and China's local pilots are similar in that both have been developed in the absence of a national emissions trading scheme. Th… Show more

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Cited by 13 publications
(3 citation statements)
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“…Quite apart from these considerations, however, we suggest that national law explicitly state that firms regulated by CO 2 ETSs can be fined without an overall financial limit, where the fine equals a multiple of the average perton market price of allowances for which the firm exceeds. We also 5 This article focuses on fees for noncompliance, but fees for misreporting or failing to report are also important as discussed by RAP (2013) and Shen et al (2014). 6 As a point of comparison, the Beijing pilot ETS imposes a noncompliance fee of three to five times a company's emissions deficit at the prevailing carbon price .…”
Section: Assessmentmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Quite apart from these considerations, however, we suggest that national law explicitly state that firms regulated by CO 2 ETSs can be fined without an overall financial limit, where the fine equals a multiple of the average perton market price of allowances for which the firm exceeds. We also 5 This article focuses on fees for noncompliance, but fees for misreporting or failing to report are also important as discussed by RAP (2013) and Shen et al (2014). 6 As a point of comparison, the Beijing pilot ETS imposes a noncompliance fee of three to five times a company's emissions deficit at the prevailing carbon price .…”
Section: Assessmentmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…At present, the Chinese government has conducted pilot carbon emission trading in seven provinces and cities [54][55][56] since 2013. The next step is to build a nationwide carbon market in 2017.…”
Section: Influence Of Carbon Pricingmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…As to the operation mechanism, a few studies analyze the comparison of the existing carbon markets. Shen et al [36] looked back to the CA CAT and drew insights for China's carbon markets involving legal basis, institutional arrangement and allowances distribution. Existing studies also concentrate on single carbon market risk and market efficiency [37].…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%