Can Climate Change Negotiations Succeed?

Abstract

More than two decades of climate change negotiations have produced a series of global climate agreements, such as the Kyoto Protocol and the Copenhagen Accords, but have nevertheless made very limited progress in curbing global emissions of greenhouse gases. This paper considers whether negotiations can succeed in reaching an agreement that effectively addresses the climate change problem. To be effective, a climate agreement must cause substantial emissions reductions either directly (in the agreement's own lifetime) or indirectly (by paving the way for a future agreement that causes substantial emissions reductions directly). To reduce global emissions substantially, an agreement must satisfy three conditions. Firstly, participation must be both comprehensive and stable. Secondly, participating countries must accept deep commitments. Finally, the agreement must obtain high compliance rates. We argue that three types of enforcement will be crucial to fulfilling these three conditions: (1) incentives for countries to ratify with deep commitments, (2) incentives for countries that have ratified with deep commitments to abstain from withdrawal, and (3) incentives for countries having ratified with deep commitments to comply with them. Based on assessing the constraints that characterize the climate change negotiations, we contend that adopting such three-fold potent enforcement will likely be politically infeasible, not only within the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, but also in the framework of a more gradual approach. Therefore, one should not expect climate change negotiations to succeed in producing an effective future agreement-either directly or indirectly.

Hope or Despair? Formal Models of Climate Cooperation

“…This will generally cause suboptimal global abatement levels (Finus 2001;Finus and Rundshagen 2003). In the case of the Kyoto protocol (Kyoto 1), at least five different forms of free riding may be distinguished (Hovi et al 2013). First, a few countries − most importantly the United States − never ratified.…”

Long-Term Climate Treaties with a Refunding Club

“…The starting point for our scheme and its analysis is the large body of game-theoretic literature on the formation of international and self-enforcing environmental agreements 3 as there is no supranational authority to enforce contracts and to ensure participation and compliance during the duration of a treaty. This literature has provided important insights into the potentialities and limitations of international environmental agreements regarding the solution of the dynamic common-pool problem that characterizes climate change, as discussed and surveyed by Bosetti et al (2009) and Hovi et al (2013). Hovi et al (2013) point out that there are three types of enforcement that are crucial for treaties to reduce global emissions substantially: (i) countries must be given incentives for ratification with deep commitment, (ii) those countries that have committed deeply when ratifying should be given incentives to remain within the treaties, and (iii) they should be given incentives to comply with them.…”

“…This literature has provided important insights into the potentialities and limitations of international environmental agreements regarding the solution of the dynamic common-pool problem that characterizes climate change, as discussed and surveyed by Bosetti et al (2009) and Hovi et al (2013). Hovi et al (2013) point out that there are three types of enforcement that are crucial for treaties to reduce global emissions substantially: (i) countries must be given incentives for ratification with deep commitment, (ii) those countries that have committed deeply when ratifying should be given incentives to remain within the treaties, and (iii) they should be given incentives to comply with them. Our Refunding Club satisfies all three requirements.…”

“…Hovi et al. ( 2013 ) point out that there are three types of enforcement that are crucial for treaties to reduce global emissions substantially: (i) countries must be given incentives for ratification with deep commitment, (ii) those countries that have committed deeply when ratifying should be given incentives to remain within the treaties, and (iii) they should be given incentives to comply with them. Our Refunding Club satisfies all three requirements.…”

Nasjonale drivkrefter i USAs klimapolitikk

“…Amerikansk deltakelse er dessuten viktig fordi det kan utløse deltakelse fra andre nøkkelland (se f.eks. Underdal et al 2012;Hovi, Skodvin & Aakre 2013). I de internasjonale klimaforhandlingene har USA og Kina lenge vaert låst i et sett av uforenlige, gjensidig betingede posisjoner.…”