Can Colour be Reduced to Anything?

Abstract

C. L. Hardin has argued that the colour opponency of the vision system leads to chromatic subjectivism: chromatic sensory states reduce to neurophysiological states. Much of the force of Hardin's argument derives from a critique of chromatic objectivism. On this view chromatic sensory states are held to reduce to an external property. While I agree with Hardin's critique of objectivism it is far from clear that the problems which beset objectivism do not apply to the subjectivist position as well. I develop a critique of subjectivism that parallels Hardin's antiobjectivist argument.

Color realism and color science

“…Consequently there is some uncertainty as to the practical (as opposed to theoretical) significance of metamerism for animals inhabiting their natural environments. In any case, it is sometimes argued that the mere possibility of metameric pairs poses a serious obstacle to any attempt to identify colors with reflectances (Dedrick 1996;Hall 1996;Hardin 1993, pp. 63-64).…”

The Scientific Explanation of Colour Qualia

“…288-9), for instance, notes that reds that are too bright are identifi ed as being only imperfectly red. 5 Dedrick ( 1996 ) points to data which indicate further diffi culties in completely separating hue identifi cation from other things, such as "motion, orientation, edges, shape , and texture" (p. S138). Contrast effects are another well-known problem in this regard.…”

Color Subjectivism is not Supported by Color Reductionism.

“…At least, focusing on the nature of bridge principles without the context of a full-blown model of reduction results in unprincipled debates. This is clearly visible in the color case and the recent debate between Dedrick (1996) and Clark (1996). The backdrop for this debate was the subjectivists' criticism of color objectivists (e.g., Hilbert, 1987) who claimed that colors reduce to external "physical" properties.…”