Abstract:A quite popular approach to solving the Causal Exclusion Problem is to adopt a counterfactual theory of causation. In this paper, I distinguish three versions of the Causal Exclusion Argument. I argue that the counterfactualist approach can block the first two exclusion arguments, because the Causal Inheritance Principle and the Upward Causation Principle upon which the two arguments are based respectively are problematic from the perspective of the counterfactual account of causation. However, I attempt to sh… Show more
“…The argument presented here T. Kroedel (B) Institut für Philosophie, Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Unter den Linden 6, 10099 Berlin, Germany e-mail: thomas.kroedel@hu-berlin.de gives a rigorous derivation of those counterfactuals and defends the claim that their truth suffices to draw causal conclusions. A recent argument by Zhong (2011Zhong ( , 2012 also attempts rigorously to show that supervenient mental events have physical effects by drawing on certain counterfactuals; I contend, however, that the argument presented here is superior to Zhong's in several respects.…”
Instances of many supervenient properties have physical effects. In particular, instances of mental properties have physical effects if non-reductive physicalism is true. This follows by a straightforward argument that assumes a counterfactual criterion for causation. The paper presents that argument and discusses several issues that arise from it. In particular, the paper addresses the worry that the argument shows too many supervenient property-instances to have physical effects. The argument is also compared to a similar argument that has been suggested by Lei Zhong and is shown to be superior to the latter.
“…The argument presented here T. Kroedel (B) Institut für Philosophie, Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Unter den Linden 6, 10099 Berlin, Germany e-mail: thomas.kroedel@hu-berlin.de gives a rigorous derivation of those counterfactuals and defends the claim that their truth suffices to draw causal conclusions. A recent argument by Zhong (2011Zhong ( , 2012 also attempts rigorously to show that supervenient mental events have physical effects by drawing on certain counterfactuals; I contend, however, that the argument presented here is superior to Zhong's in several respects.…”
Instances of many supervenient properties have physical effects. In particular, instances of mental properties have physical effects if non-reductive physicalism is true. This follows by a straightforward argument that assumes a counterfactual criterion for causation. The paper presents that argument and discusses several issues that arise from it. In particular, the paper addresses the worry that the argument shows too many supervenient property-instances to have physical effects. The argument is also compared to a similar argument that has been suggested by Lei Zhong and is shown to be superior to the latter.
“…Here are some examples from the literature of physical causal completeness qua physical cause condition: If a physical event has a cause at t , then it has a physical cause at t (Kim , 15; cf. Kim , 43).All physical events which have a cause have a physical cause that is simultaneous with that cause (Kroedel and Schultz , 1916).A physical event e that has a cause must have a physical cause (Zhong , 137).All physical effects are due to physical causes (Spurrett and Papineau , 25).While these principles vary slightly, they share the common focus on p as a physical cause of p *, without prioritizing the requirement that p is a sufficient physical cause of p *, which shows that condition (i) commonly represents physical causal completeness.…”
Section: Difference‐making and Completenessmentioning
Nonreductive physicalists endorse the principle of mental causation, according to which some events have mental causes. Nonreductive physicalists also endorse the principle of physical causal completeness, according to which physical events have sufficient physical causes. Critics typically level the causal exclusion problem against this nonreductive physicalist model, according to which the physical cause is a sufficient cause of the behavioural effect, so the mental cause is excluded from causally influencing the behaviour. Numerous nonreductive physicalists have responded to the causal exclusion problem by weakening the principle of physical causal completeness in various ways. The result: either various nonreductive physicalist solutions fail on account of the fact that they do not satisfy a robustly defined principle of physical causal completeness, or there is an accelerating trend of solving the causal exclusion problem by suitably weakening the principle of physical causal completeness.
“…When intuitions conflict, we'd better seek for arguments. In what follows, I attempt to present a causal exclusion argument for (P2), inspired by discussion of the exclusion problem in the philosophy of mind (see Kim , ; Zhong , ).…”
Section: The Exclusion Problem In Semanticsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Many philosophers of mind insist that the most plausible solution to the exclusion problem is to adopt the so‐called ‘autonomy approach’ (Yablo ; Crisp and Warfield ; Gibbons ; Zhong , , , ). On this approach, mental properties can cause higher‐level properties (such as mental, behavioral, and social properties) even if they fail to cause physical properties; physical properties only cause physical properties without causing those higher‐level properties.…”
Section: The Autonomy Approach: a Disanalogymentioning
confidence: 99%
“… I want to briefly mention two objections to the autonomy approach (Zhong , , ). First , one may argue that M1 can cause M2 only by causing the realizer of M2, P2.…”
Semantic normativism, which is the view that semantic properties/concepts are some kind of normative properties/concepts, has become increasingly influential in contemporary meta-semantics. In this paper, I aim to argue that semantic normativism has difficulty accommodating the causal efficacy of semantic properties. In specific, I raise an exclusion problem for semantic normativism, inspired by the exclusion problem in the philosophy of mind. Moreover, I attempt to show that the exclusion problem for semantic normativism is peculiarly troublesome: while we can solve (or dissolve) mental-physical exclusion by adopting the so-called 'autonomy approach', a similar autonomy solution to semantic exclusion is implausible if semantic properties are understood as normative properties.
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