Can Innate, Modular “Foundations” Explain Morality? Challenges for Haidt's Moral Foundations Theory

Abstract

Jonathan Haidt's Moral Foundations Theory is an influential scientific account of morality incorporating psychological, developmental, and evolutionary perspectives. The theory proposes that morality is built upon five innate "foundations," each of which is believed to have been selected for during human evolution and, subsequently, tuned-up by learning during development. We argue here that although some general elements of Haidt's theory are plausible, many other important aspects of his account are seriously flawed. First, innateness and modularity figure centrally in Haidt's account, but terminological and conceptual problems foster confusion and ambiguities. Second, both the theory's proposed number of moral foundations and its taxonomy of the moral domain appear contrived, ignoring equally good candidate foundations and the possibility of substantial intergroup differences in the foundations' contents. Third, the mechanisms (viz., modules) and categorical distinctions (viz., between foundations) proposed by the theory are not consilient with discoveries in contemporary neuroscience concerning the organization, functioning, and development of the brain. In light of these difficulties, we suggest that Haidt's theory is inadequate as a scientific account of morality. Nevertheless, the theory's weaknesses are instructive, and hence, criticism may be useful to psychologists, neuroscientists, and philosophers attempting to advance theories of morality, as well as to researchers wishing to invoke concepts such as innateness and modularity more generally.

How Moral Foundations Theory Succeeded in Building on Sand: A Response to Suhler and Churchland

“…These three complaints are close analogues of the complaints Suhler and Churchland (2011) level against Moral Foundations Theory (MFT): (1) Our concepts of innateness and modularity are defective and cannot support the theory. (2) There are additional candidates for foundationhood.…”

“…Third, the mechanisms (viz., modules) and categorical distinctions (viz., between foundations) proposed by the theory are not consilient with discoveries in contemporary neuroscience concerning the organization, functioning, and development of the brain (Suhler & Churchland, 2011, p. 2103). …”

“…Second, both the theoryʼs proposed number of moral foundations and its taxonomy of the moral domain appear contrived, ignoring equally good candidate foundations and the possibility of substantial intergroup differences in the foundationsʼ contents (Suhler & Churchland, 2011, p. 2103.…”

Deontic Justice and Organizational Neuroscience

“…These childhood preferences reflect an 'innate' distinction that persists into adulthood-that between moral norms and social conventions (for a discussion on innateness and morality, see Haidt and Joseph 2007;Suhler and Churchland 2011). A social convention is a rule of behavior that, while making community life potentially more efficient, is not seen as correct for its own sake (Nucci and Nucci 1982).…”

Valuation of Morality and Mind: Morality as a Metacognitive Byproduct

“…Their association with morality could simply be an artefact of adaptive immorality. Modular intuitionist accounts have also been criticised based on a purported weak theoretical basis [38]. There exist little analogies at present to how five (or more) independent systems could evolve to facilitate morality, be encoded in the brain, and converge to produce a single cognitive response.…”