Can Jurors Free Themselves from Retributive Objectives?

Abstract

We examined the hypothesis that the conscious self-correction process in the models of lay citizens' determination of punishment could inhibit the retributive goal that was their instinctive default objective. In two experiments, we tested whether an instruction to ignore the retributive goal could eliminate the influence of information about the seriousness of the crime on the severity of the punishment. If the retributive goal can be inhibited, the instruction would eliminate the information's influence on the punishment's severity. However, the persistence of the information's influence would mean that the retributive goal is not inhibited. The result showed that the instruction eliminated the influence of information that decreased the crime's seriousness but could barely reduce the influence of information that increased the seriousness. We concluded that self-correction cannot inhibit the retributive goal when its inhibition would lead to a more lenient punishment.

Wrongful Conviction Rates and Death Penalty Support: Acceptability Hypothesis in Japan

“…By combining two theoretical frameworks, namely, the framing effect (e.g., Gong et al, 2013; Kühberger, 1998; Levin et al, 1985; Tversky & Kahneman, 1981) and retributive justification (Brubacher, 2018; Carlsmith, 2006; Keller et al, 2010; Rucker et al, 2004; Watamura et al, 2011), this study examined the effects of experimentally manipulating the loss caused by false accusations on attitudes toward the death penalty. We found no difference in support for the death penalty between groups with or without information that emphasized the unique loss from retribution justification, given that the number of true criminals evading justice is the same as the number of people falsely convicted.…”

“…The cognitive-psychology literature has robustly confirmed that humans tend to make loss-averse judgments and are less likely to accept alternatives that emphasize losses (i.e., the framing effect; Chong & Druckman, 2007; Gong et al, 2013; Kühberger, 1998; Levin et al, 1985; Tversky & Kahneman, 1981). The public’s attitude regarding the punishment of offenders is based on retributive justification, which seeks to offset crime through punishment (Brubacher, 2018; Carlsmith, 2006; Carlsmith & Darley, 2008; Finckenauer, 1988; Keller et al, 2010; Rucker et al, 2004; Watamura et al, 2011). The public must therefore view the “other side of the coin” of a wrongful conviction, that is, the real culprit going unpunished, as a loss.…”

Comparing sentencing judgments of judges and laypeople: The role of justifications

“…These studies have suggested that laypeople prefer retributive focused philosophies, as opposed to the human image of living in a civilized society that is receptive to the mistakes of the accused. Laypeople tend to resolve moral imbalances by harsh punishment commensurate with the severity of the crime, without much consideration of the practical effects of the punishment [ 1 – 4 , 7 – 13 ]. Prior studies have found positive arguments supporting the fact that retribution serves as the perpetrator’s compensation to society [ 14 ] and that it should not be neglected to maintain public confidence in the judiciary [ 15 ].…”

Justification of Sentencing Decisions: Development of a Ratio-Based Measure Tested on Child Neglect Cases

“…Previous empirical studies have reported that the public adopts retribution as the predominant or nearly sole justification (McCorkle, 1993;Weiner et al, 1997;Carlsmith et al, 2002;Oswald et al, 2002;Orth, 2003;Rucker et al, 2004;Carlsmith, 2006Carlsmith, , 2008Alter et al, 2007;Carlsmith and Darley, 2008;Gromet and Darley, 2009;Okimoto et al, 2009;Keller et al, 2010;Watamura et al, 2011;Gerber and Jackson, 2013;Twardawski et al, 2020). With respect to sentencing decisions for serious crimes such as murder, retribution is the default justification ".…”