Can Politicians Police Themselves? Natural Experimental Evidence From Brazil’s Audit Courts

Abstract

To enhance government accountability, reformers have advocated strengthening institutions of "horizontal accountability", particularly auditing institutions that can punish lawbreaking elected officials. Yet these institutions differ in their willingness to punish corrupt politicians, which is often attributed to variation in their degree of independence from the political branches. Taking advantage of a randomized natural experiment embedded in Brazil's State Audit Courts, we study how variation in the appointment mechanisms for choosing auditors affects political accountability. We show that auditors appointed under few constraints by elected officials punish lawbreaking politicians-particularly co-partisans-at lower rates than bureaucrats insulated from political influence. Additionally, we find that even when executives are heavily constrained in their appointment of auditors by meritocratic and professional requirements, auditors still exhibit a pro-politician bias in decision-making. Our results suggest that removing bias requires a level of insulation from politics rare among institutions of horizontal accountability.

Horizontal But Not Vertical: Accountability Institutions and Electoral Sanctioning in Northeast Brazil

“…The degree to which political factors influence decision-making varies substantially, and Pernambuco's court is considered one of the most professional and least politicized (Melo, Pereira, and Figueiredo 2009). However, decisions by its councilors with political careers do show some evidence of favoritism toward co-partisan mayors (Hidalgo, Canello, and Lima-de-Oliveira 2016).…”

“…An emerging literature on horizontal accountability in Brazil has documented the implications of these political ties. TCEs tend to punish governments more readily when the councilors are politically diverse (Melo, Pereira, and Figueiredo 2009), whereas councilors tend to treat co-partisan politicians more leniently (Hidalgo, Canello, and Lima-de-Oliveira 2016). The degree to which political factors influence decision-making varies substantially, and Pernambuco's court is considered one of the most professional and least politicized (Melo, Pereira, and Figueiredo 2009).…”

Consequences of an Anti‐Corruption Experiment for Local Government Performance in Brazil

“…In the case of Brazil, which we explain in greater detail below, the Tribunal de Contas da União (TCU) is the federal audit court and is associated with the legislative branch as a means of overseeing the executive, while the Controladoria‐Geral da União (CGU), established in 2001, is housed within the executive branch as a means of overseeing public finances. There are also additional state audit courts (Hidalgo, Canello, & Lima‐de‐Oliveira, ).…”

“…In 2003, the Brazilian federal government, under the auspices of the Brazilian Office of the Comptroller General (Controladoria-Geral da União, henceforth CGU), began conducting random audits of municipal governments to oversee the use of federal 2 As an exception, see Hidalgo, Canello, and Lima-de-Oliveira (2016), who find that the selection procedures of auditors influence auditors' willingness to sanction state governments in Brazilian state audit courts. 3 Project Number: BR0403.…”

As lógicas conflitantes no Tribunal de Contas e o enfraquecimento de sua relevância social

“…Segundo, há uma camada inferior ou técnica, formada por servidores públicos concursados que é responsável pelas atividades de auditoria (Hidalgo et al, 2016). Ainda há uma camada operacional, que permeia as atividades da organização mas não atua diretamente na auditoria, em que servidores atuam em tarefas administrativas e a forma de ingresso varia entre indicação política e concursos públicos.…”