Can you feel what you do not see? Using internal feedback to detect briefly presented emotional stimuli

Bornemann, Boris; Winkielman, Piotr; Meer, Elke van der

doi:10.1016/j.ijpsycho.2011.04.007

Cited by 93 publications

(72 citation statements)

References 47 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…Inspired by the psychological studies mentioned above (Bornemann et al, 2011;Shen et al, 2012;W. Li et al, 2008), we performed two sets of experiments with subjects.…”

Section: Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The first experiment is in Bornemann et al (Bornemann et al, 2011) where microexpressions are presented fast enough (10ms and 20ms exposure) to ensure that people cannot perceive them consciously. The question asked is whether such unaware subjects can "feel" the emotion of this expression.…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Currently, microexpressions have been investigated mostly in the context of lying and deception detection (Matsumoto & Hwang, 2011;Porter & ten Brinke, 2008, 2010Vrij, Granhag, & Porter, 2010). Other studies investigate the human capability to perceive, consciously or unconsciously, microexpressions and the role they play in communication and human behavior (Bornemann, Winkielman, & van der Meer, 2011;Shen et al, 2012;W. Li, Zinbarg, Boehm, & Paller, 2008).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In this context, this paper explores users' perception of hidden emotions in virtual faces, inspired by recent psychological experiments (Bornemann et al, 2011;Shen et al, 2012). We investigate the hypothesis that facial microexpressions (at some subliminal presentation level) can subtly suggest a second emotion to a user even when embedded in a neutral or conflicting facial expression.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 3 more Smart Citations

Investigating Macroexpressions and Microexpressions in Computer Graphics Animated Faces

Queiroz

Musse

Badler

2014

Presence: Teleoperators and Virtual Environments

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Due to varied personal, social, or even cultural situations, people sometimes conceal or mask their true emotions. These suppressed emotions can be expressed in a very subtle way by brief movements called microexpressions. We investigate human subjects' perception of hidden emotions in virtual faces, inspired by recent psychological experiments. We created animations with virtual faces showing some facial expressions and inserted brief secondary expressions in some sequences, in order to try to convey a subtle second emotion in the character. Our evaluation methodology consists of two sets of experiments, with three different sets of questions. The first experiment verifies that the accuracy and concordance of the participant's responses with synthetic faces matches the empirical results done with photos of real people in the paper by X.-b. Shen, Q. Wu, and X.-l. Fu, 2012, "Effects of the duration of expressions on the recognition of microexpressions," Journal of Zhejiang University Science B, 13(3), 221-230. The second experiment verifies whether participants could perceive and identify primary and secondary emotions in virtual faces. The third experiment tries to evaluate the participant's perception of realism, deceit, and valence of the emotions. Our results show that most of the participants recognized the foreground (macro) emotion and most of the time they perceived the presence of the second (micro) emotion in the animations, although they did not identify it correctly in some samples. This experiment exposes the benefits of conveying microexpressions in computer graphics characters, as they may visually enhance a character's emotional depth through subliminal microexpression cues, and consequently increase the perceived social complexity and believability (Shen, Wu, & Fu, 2012). The second experiment verifies if participants could perceive and identify primary and secondary emotions in virtual faces. The third tries to evaluate the participant's perception of realism, deceit and valence of the emotions. Our results show that most of the participants recognized the foreground (macro) emotion and most of the time they had perceived the presence of the second (micro) emotion in the animations, although they did not identify it correctly in some samples. This experiment exposes the benefits of conveying microexpressions in Computer Graphics characters, as they may visually enhance a character's emotional "depth" through subliminal microexpression cues and consequently increase its perceived social complexity and believability.

show abstract

“…Inspired by the psychological studies mentioned above (Bornemann et al, 2011;Shen et al, 2012;W. Li et al, 2008), we performed two sets of experiments with subjects.…”

Section: Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 2 more Smart Citations

Investigating Macroexpressions and Microexpressions in Computer Graphics Animated Faces

Queiroz

Musse

Badler

2014

Presence: Teleoperators and Virtual Environments

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…Second, studies using subliminal stimulus presentation methods (e.g., backward masking or continuous flash suppression) to prevent or reduce awareness of visual stimuli show that visual threats activate the amygdala and elicit body responses despite the fact that participants deny seeing the stimulus (21)(22)(23)(24)(25)(26)(27)(28)(29)(30). Under such conditions, participants do not report feeling fear, even when explicitly instructed to be introspective about what they are experiencing (39). Third, "blindsight" patients, who lack the ability to consciously see visual stimuli in a particular area of visual space, exhibit amygdala activation and physiological responses to visual threats presented in that part of space despite denying seeing the stimulus and without reporting fear (40-42) (see SI Appendix, Box 2 for a discussion of blindsight and other neurological patients that have contributed to consciousness research).…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

A higher-order theory of emotional consciousness

LeDoux

Brown

2017

Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A.

469

417

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Emotional states of consciousness, or what are typically called emotional feelings, are traditionally viewed as being innately programmed in subcortical areas of the brain, and are often treated as different from cognitive states of consciousness, such as those related to the perception of external stimuli. We argue that conscious experiences, regardless of their content, arise from one system in the brain. In this view, what differs in emotional and nonemotional states are the kinds of inputs that are processed by a general cortical network of cognition, a network essential for conscious experiences. Although subcortical circuits are not directly responsible for conscious feelings, they provide nonconscious inputs that coalesce with other kinds of neural signals in the cognitive assembly of conscious emotional experiences. In building the case for this proposal, we defend a modified version of what is known as the higher-order theory of consciousness.uch progress has been made in conceptualizing consciousness in recent years. This work has focused on the question of how we come to be aware of our sensory world, and has suggested that perceptual consciousness emerges via cognitive processing in cortical circuits that assemble conscious experiences in real-time. Emotional states of consciousness, on the other hand, have traditionally been viewed as involving innately programmed experiences that arise from subcortical circuits.Our thesis is that the brain mechanisms that give rise to conscious emotional feelings are not fundamentally different from those that give rise to perceptual conscious experiences. Both, we propose, involve higher-order representations (HORs) of lowerorder information by cortically based general networks of cognition (GNC). Thus, subcortical circuits are not responsible for feelings, but instead provide lower-order, nonconscious inputs that coalesce with other kinds of neural signals in the cognitive assembly of conscious emotional experiences by cortical circuits (the distinction between cortical and subcortical circuits is defined in SI Appendix, Box 1). Our theory goes beyond traditional higher-order theory (HOT), arguing that self-centered higherorder states are essential for emotional experiences.Emotion, Consciousness, and the Brain Detailed understanding of the emotional brain, and theorizing about it, is largely based on studies that fall under the heading of "fear." We will therefore focus on this body of work in discussing emotional consciousness. In light of this approach, we define "fear" as the conscious feeling one has when in danger. Although our conclusions may not apply equally well to all emotions, we maintain that the lessons from fear provide general principles that can at least be used as a starting point for theorizing about many emotions.The Amygdala Fear Circuit View. Emotions like fear are often said to have been inherited from animal ancestors (1-6). These "basic emotions" are typically proposed to be wired into the brain's limbic system (7). Although the limbic sy...

show abstract