Candidatos corruptos são punidos?: accountability na eleição brasileira de 2006

Abstract

Um dos principais temas da teoria democrática é o processo por meio do qual os cidadãos controlam a atividade de seus representantes. Neste artigo, analisam-se o sistema político brasileiro em termos gerais e as eleições de 1998 e 2006 em particular, com o objetivo de discutir se o processo de accountability vertical nos interstícios eleitorais torna os cidadãos capazes de punir ou recompensar seus representantes na eleição seguinte. A importância deste artigo está na análise dos efeitos do envolvimento de políticos nos escândalos do Mensalão e dos Sanguessugas, que abalaram a sociedade brasileira nos dois anos que precederam a eleição de 2006. Apesar dos custos de informação, dos baixos interesse e envolvimento político, da desigualdade social e pobreza característicos da sociedade brasileira, os eleitores foram capazes de punir grande parte dos políticos denunciados nos escândalos.

The Political Cost of Corruption: Scandals, Campaign Finance, and Reelection in the Brazilian Chamber of Deputies

“…Overall, incumbents involved in malfeasance scandals are more likely not to run and, if they do, they are more likely to lose office. This renders further confirmation to prior studies on Brazil (Rennó 2008;Pereira, Rennó, and Samuels 2011;Castro and Nunes 2014). Based on our estimates, involvement in corruption scandals implies an 18 percent decrease in the probability of reelection, ceteris paribus.…”

“…Such episodes may increase the efforts that politicians make to mitigate the effect of corruption scandals. Brazil would fit this description well given the complexity of its open-list proportional system for lower-house legislative elections and the saliency of corruption scandals in the 2006 elections (Rennó 2008;Castro and Nunes 2014;Balán 2014). Because voters can vote for individual candidates on the party electoral slate, punishing or rewarding incumbents individually, lawmakers have strong incentives to cultivate their individual reputation.…”

“…To the best of our knowledge, the present study is the first to address the effect of campaign finance on lawmakers' reputational losses from involvement in corruption. Rennó (2008) and Castro and Nunes (2014) have examined the effect of corruption scandal on the reelection rate of federal deputies in the 2006 election. Pereira, Rennó, and Samuels (2011) have added to the literature by claiming that involvement in scandals reduces candidates' campaign finances, which indirectly affects their electoral chances in subsequent elections.…”

Read this paper if you want to learn logistic regression

“…This paper provides an intuitive introduction to logistic regression, the most appropriate statistical technique to deal with dichotomous dependent variables. Materials and Methods: we estimate the effect of corruption scandals on the chance of reelection of candidates running for the Brazilian Chamber of Deputies using data from Castro and Nunes (2014). Specifically, we show the computational implementation in R and we explain the substantive interpretation of the results.…”

A Adoção Do Recall Como Instrumento De Ampliação Do Controle Popular Dos Mandatos Políticos

“…Candidatos corruptos são punidos? -Accountability na eleição brasileirade 2006. Opinião Pública, Campinas, vol.…”