Canons of Ethics and Accountability in State Supreme Court Elections

Abstract

This article examines the influence of several canons within state codes of judicial ethics aimed at constraining the campaigning of candidates running for U.S. state judicial office. These canons have been much debated since 2002, when the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that one of them, the announce clause, unconstitutionally restricted the free speech rights of candidates. Based on their likely influence on the availability of information in judicial contests, I hypothesize that the primary effect of these canons is to make incumbents less accountable to the public. Looking at U.S. state supreme court contests from 1998 to 2006 where incumbents are seeking re-election, I find strong evidence that four of the five canons make it less likely for challengers to arise, and I also find evidence that restrictions on candidate solicitation of funds favor incumbents in the general election.

When Money Cannot Encourage Participation: Campaign Spending and Rolloff in Low Visibility Judicial Elections

“…The research to date on the relationship between campaign spending and participation has focused exclusively at the supreme court level (Bonneau 2005(Bonneau , 2007aBonneau and Hall 2009;Hall and Bonneau 2008;Peters 2009). 14 The mystery of what is going on in elections for lower courts still needs unraveling.…”

“…As observed by Hall and Bonneau (2008), races without opposition are not likely to be random events. Indeed, there is an extensive body of literature establishing that a variety of systematic factors influence whether judicial elections feature two opponents running against one another (Bonneau 2005;Bonneau and Hall 2009;Bonneau 2006, 2008;Frederick and Streb 2008;Peters 2009). Hence, estimating the relationship between campaign spending and ballot rolloff in contested races without accounting for selection effects could result in biased estimates leading to invalid statistical inferences.…”

Expectancy Theory and the Election of Judges: Do Judicial Campaigns Really Stink?

“…11 9 Gibson (2012, 110) makes this argument (see also Gibson 2008b). These normative constraints are occasionally reinforced by legal restrictions, as in prohibitions about what a candidate can say about public policies and restrictions on fund-raising activities (e.g., Peters 2009). Many campaign activities that would be expected from candidates for other public offices have been legally banned if done by candidates for judicial office.…”

Oh, Mi

“…On the other hand, Brace and Hall (1993; Hall and Brace 1992; 1999), in their studies of state judicial decision-making in death penalty cases, classify Ohio as a partisan election state. Likewise, Peters (2009), in his examination of the effects of state canons of judicial conduct, classifies both states as partisan election states. Streb, Frederick, and LaFrance (2007) classify intermediate appellate court elections in these states as partisan contests, and Streb (2007) classifies Ohio Court of Common Pleas contests as partisan elections in his study of party involvement in judicial campaigns.…”