This article examines the influence of several canons within state codes of judicial ethics aimed at constraining the campaigning of candidates running for U.S. state judicial office. These canons have been much debated since 2002, when the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that one of them, the announce clause, unconstitutionally restricted the free speech rights of candidates. Based on their likely influence on the availability of information in judicial contests, I hypothesize that the primary effect of these canons is to make incumbents less accountable to the public. Looking at U.S. state supreme court contests from 1998 to 2006 where incumbents are seeking re-election, I find strong evidence that four of the five canons make it less likely for challengers to arise, and I also find evidence that restrictions on candidate solicitation of funds favor incumbents in the general election.
This article asks two questions stemming from a conflict in the literature on the U.S. Supreme Court's attention to issues: (1) Are levels of legal mobilization explained by salient Court decisions? (2) Is the Court's level of attention explained by levels of legal mobilization? To answer them, the author tests hypotheses from the public policy and public law literature on data from seven specific issue areas. The author finds that levels of legal mobilization cannot be explained by past salient decisions of the Court but finds some evidence that changes in the Court's levels of attention are explained by levels of mobilization.
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