Capacity-testing as a means of increasing political inclusion

Abstract

Abstract:Some competent political actors, primarily young people and the cognitively impaired, are excluded from political participation by modern liberal democratic states. This exclusion occurs because the means utilised by states to distinguish between competent citizens (who must be included) and incompetent ones (who may be excluded) are imperfect. They include age restrictions on enfranchisement and, commonly, legal restrictions on enfranchisement for those with cognitive disabilities. Capacity testing provides a means to improve on these existing mechanisms for exclusion. It is not, however, often suggested, nor seen as viable. Here, I argue that we should utilise capacity testing to more effectively include capable citizens in our democratic practice. I defend a particular scope and kind of capacity testing against common objections.

Political Inclusion as a Means of Generating Justice for Children

“…As such, there is potential for the improvement of global justice for children through the institution in any particular context of equal political participation for children -the state which did this would be an exemplar, whether of the risks or the benefits of inclusion. For reasons I have discussed elsewhere, at length, I am convinced that the result of such a move towards the inclusion of the young would be beneficial, not just for the children who are enfranchised, but for the democracy which enfranchises them, and for the other citizens within that democracy (Munn, 2012a(Munn, , 2012b(Munn, , 2014(Munn, , 2018. This is because democratic participation is a means to a range of positive ends, or, as Lansdown puts it, "democratic participation is not just an end in itself.…”

“…So, in both cases, there is a wrong inflicted, of not having interests taken into account, and another wrong, present for many children, of being excluded from decision-making despite having the relevant competence for political agency. While this latter claim remains controversial, it has been widely defended in recent years (Munn, 2012a(Munn, , 2012b(Munn, , 2014Umbers, 2018;Lau, 2012).…”

“…I have elsewhere made the case that the exclusion of children from the franchise is unjustified, but in those articles, I have not been concerned with developing a positive account of the benefits to democracy and to children, that could be gained from their political inclusion. Rather, I had focused solely on the injustice of their exclusion (Munn, 2012a(Munn, , 2012b(Munn, , 2014. Here, while the injustice of the exclusion of children from the franchise remains important, I also explore the benefits of inclusion, as a means of further strengthening the case.…”

Age-Distinctions, The Philosophy of Childhood, and Political Participation

“…In the literature, some have argued for an age of majority as young as 6-years (Runciman in Weaver 2018). Others have argued against a minimum voting age at all, arguing for eligibility through a procedural test (Munn 2012a(Munn , 2014Cook 2013). Including children would mean that children and young people could challenge issues about which they already protest and that directly affect them, such as climate change and gun violence in schools (see Wood and Munn 2018).…”

“…One might argue that very minimal, procedural competency testing is appropriate (Munn 2012a(Munn , 2014Cook 2013). We can invoke thick and thin conceptions of political competence (Cook 2013, 450-456).…”