2002
DOI: 10.1017/s0022278x0200397x
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Capital, power and business associations in the African political economy: a tale of two countries, Ghana and Nigeria

Abstract: In this era of neo-liberal capitalist economics in Africa, has organised private capital in the form of business associations (BAs) become more active in public life or developed influence in public policy formation or implementation? This analysis examines the impact of five key factors to explain varying activity levels and influence of BAs in Ghana and Nigeria since independence: levels of capitalist development and hence size of the capitalist class; strength and autonomy of the capitalist class; strength … Show more

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Cited by 45 publications
(38 citation statements)
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“…In this case, market-oriented firms have a hard time competing with network-based firms, unless they also rely on interpersonal links within the state. In the particular case of cross-border trade, the difficulty of predicting which of the formal or informal rules will be applied when dealing with trade agreements, blockade of key ports, or border conflicts, has led many traders to develop clientelist ties with state officials, or engage in politics themselves (Boone, 2006;Kraus, 2002;Tijani Alou, 2012).…”
Section: Social Network and Economic Performancementioning
confidence: 99%
“…In this case, market-oriented firms have a hard time competing with network-based firms, unless they also rely on interpersonal links within the state. In the particular case of cross-border trade, the difficulty of predicting which of the formal or informal rules will be applied when dealing with trade agreements, blockade of key ports, or border conflicts, has led many traders to develop clientelist ties with state officials, or engage in politics themselves (Boone, 2006;Kraus, 2002;Tijani Alou, 2012).…”
Section: Social Network and Economic Performancementioning
confidence: 99%
“…Patron-client ties and notions of reciprocity have deep pre-colonial roots on Ghanaian soil (Arhin 1990;Kraus 1971;McCaskie 1995;Owusu 1970); the model retains a consistency with rational actor models of collective action; and finally, the analysis is consistent with well informed studies of elections in neighbouring states (Crook 1997). The NDC has clearly constructed a peripheral coalition much like those described in the G-M model.…”
Section: Additional Sources Of Peripheral Supportmentioning
confidence: 66%
“…7 The theory has been most systematically elaborated by Tilly (1992) and Poggi (1990). 8 For an excellent and often overlooked accounting of the economic impact of the initial period of adjustment see Kraus (1991). 9 I emphasize that many other critical agents and liturgical organizations are not addressed here.…”
Section: Notesmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Even in countries like Ghana, which had embraced a neoliberal model in 1983 (Kraus 2002;Arthur 2006;Opoku 2010), and Kenya (Arriola 2013), a quintessentially 'Afro-capitalist' state, there was innate hostility to private business outside of state strictures. Instead, political elites embraced only narrow benefits for co-ethnics and were considerably hostile to autonomous private sector growth.…”
Section: Promoting Virtuous Circles: Government Policy and Private Sementioning
confidence: 99%