2015
DOI: 10.1111/isqu.12211
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Capital Preferences: International Capital and Government Partisanship

Abstract: Many argue that government partisanship influences the size of investment flows into stocks and bonds. But existing literature tells us little about how international capital flows influence election outcomes. I argue that passive investment into stocks, bonds, and other debt instruments—in other words, portfolio investments—increases political contributions to right‐wing parties. This investment generates resources for domestic capitalists. These owners of capital then channel these resources into political c… Show more

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Cited by 4 publications
(3 citation statements)
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“…The same is true for electoral preferences, which clearly change over time, some of which lasts to impact the outcome and some does not (Erikson and Wlezien, 2012). We also see evidence of short-term and enduring changes in studies of political economy, such as the determinants of global capital mobility (Ahlquist, 2006) and its electoral consequences (Tomashevskiy, 2015). It may be that most seemingly “pure” integrated series actually are combined, where in addition to shocks to the series that cumulate over time there are shocks that decay.…”
Section: Identifying True Relationships With Mixed Orders Of Integrationmentioning
confidence: 89%
“…The same is true for electoral preferences, which clearly change over time, some of which lasts to impact the outcome and some does not (Erikson and Wlezien, 2012). We also see evidence of short-term and enduring changes in studies of political economy, such as the determinants of global capital mobility (Ahlquist, 2006) and its electoral consequences (Tomashevskiy, 2015). It may be that most seemingly “pure” integrated series actually are combined, where in addition to shocks to the series that cumulate over time there are shocks that decay.…”
Section: Identifying True Relationships With Mixed Orders Of Integrationmentioning
confidence: 89%
“…If parties are unequally dependent on business funding, this will influence how they construct their interests in political finance reform (Koß, 2011; Scarrow, 2004). The way in which broader public policy affects funders will depend on whether those funders represent the business sector (McMenamin, 2012: 9–13; Tomashevskiy, 2015). If some parties are more dependent on business than others, this will affect public opinion on political finance, especially preferences on the regulation of business donations and the political construction of scandals (Fisher, 2015a; McMenamin, 2015).…”
Section: Business Preferences and Political Financementioning
confidence: 99%
“…If parties are unequally dependent on business funding, this will influence how they construct their interests in political finance reform (Koß 2011;Scarrow 2004). The way in which broader public policy affects funders will depend on whether those funders represent the business sector (McMenamin 2012, 9-13;Tomashevskiy 2015). If some parties are more dependent on business than others, this will affect public opinion on political finance, especially preferences on the regulation of business donations and the political construction of scandals (Fisher 2015a;McMenamin 2015).…”
Section: Business Preferences and Political Financementioning
confidence: 99%