Objective: While the aim of COVID-19 policies is to suppress the pandemic, many fear that the burden of the restrictions will fall more heavily on less privileged groups. We show one potential mechanism for COVID-19 responses to increase inequality by examining the intersection of business restrictions and business political connections. Methods: We fielded an online survey of 2735 business employees and managers in Ukraine, Egypt, and Venezuela over the summer of 2020 to collect data on companies' closures due to COVID-19 and nuanced information about their political connections. Findings: We show that businesses with political connections to government officials were significantly less likely to shut down as a result of COVID-19 policies. This finding suggests that measures designed to mitigate COVID-19 are ineffective in countries with a weak rule of law if politically connected firms are able to circumvent restrictions by leveraging political connections to receive preferential treatment. In addition, politically connected firms are no more likely-and sometimes even less likely-to engage in social-distancing policies to mitigate the pandemic despite the fact that they are more likely to remain open.

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An important dimension of party positioning remains largely unexamined—that is, the clarity with which parties present policies to the electorate. Moreover, the effects of private campaign contributions on party positions are also vastly understudied. We address these gaps using a unique new data set on private contributions to political parties in eight Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries from the early 1990s to the present. We argue that parties are incentivized to present increasingly ambiguous, or broad appeal, policy positions as a result of increased private campaign contributions. Broad appeal campaigns allow parties to appease their donors with more extreme policy preferences while maintaining the support of their more moderate base supporters. We find support for this argument and show that increasing donations are associated with increased policy ambiguity. Using new data, this article is the first to examine an important connection between political finance and party positioning on a cross-national and time-series basis.

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Many argue that government partisanship influences the size of investment flows into stocks and bonds. But existing literature tells us little about how international capital flows influence election outcomes. I argue that passive investment into stocks, bonds, and other debt instruments—in other words, portfolio investments—increases political contributions to right‐wing parties. This investment generates resources for domestic capitalists. These owners of capital then channel these resources into political contributions to right‐wing parties and enhance those parties' electoral position. Thus, passive investment bolsters the electoral chances of right‐wing governments. I illustrate this process with a formal model of special interest politics in which lobbies operate under budget constraint. Using a new data set on political contributions and statistical analyses for a sample of states from 1980–2009, I find support for my general argument.