Does private money increase party extremism?

Tomashevskiy, Andrey

doi:10.1080/17457289.2019.1652619

Cited by 3 publications

(5 citation statements)

References 65 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…International organizations like Transparency International and the Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA) have found that the lack of public funding increases corruption risks (Bosso et al, 2014; OECD, 2016). Without public funding, private interests use private financing to influence party ideology, policy agenda legislation, or get public contracts (Andía and Hamada, 2019; Hummel et al, 2019; Tomashevskiy, 2022). For example, Hummel et al (2019) found that public funding reduces the importance of private money and increases sanctions for corruption, reducing it.…”

Section: Measuring Corruption Risks In Political Partiesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…For example, Hummel et al (2019) found that public funding reduces the importance of private money and increases sanctions for corruption, reducing it. In another study, Tomashevskiy (2022) found that private money influences party ideology, making parties’ ideology more extreme. For that reason, international organizations recognize that the electoral campaigns and the day-to-day functioning of the political party should be funded with public resources to reduce the risk of capture and corruption.…”

Section: Measuring Corruption Risks In Political Partiesmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

Measuring the risk of corruption in Latin American political parties. De jure analysis of institutions

Rodríguez-García

2022

Data & Policy

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Research that examines the impact of economic, social, and political factors on political corruption uses expert’ and citizen’ perceptions for measuring corruption and testing arguments. Scholars argue that the perception of corruption is a good proxy for actual corruption because data on actual corruption are limited and not entirely trustworthy. However, perception indexes do not allow for testing separate mechanisms driving citizen’ perceptions of corruption from actual levels of corruption in different government branches. To address this issue, I introduce a new index based on Latin American countries to measure the risk of corruption in political parties. Using a de jure analysis of laws and regulations, the Risk of Corruption (ROC) index evaluates the likelihood of political parties engaging in corrupt activities. Instead of measuring corrupt activities or perception directly, the ROC measures the risks of involving in corruption. The index has important implications for academics and practitioners in anti-corruption issues. First, it allows us to test arguments about the role of political parties and legislatures in reducing political corruption. Second, it helps to understand how political parties could improve their internal organization to decrease the risk of corrupt activities. Finally, it is a valuable instrument for cross-national studies in diverse fields that study political parties.

show abstract

Section: Measuring Corruption Risks In Political Partiesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Measuring Corruption Risks In Political Partiesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Measuring the risk of corruption in Latin American political parties. De jure analysis of institutions

Rodríguez-García

2022

Data & Policy

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…Firstly, and clearly related to the ‘responsive argument’ mentioned above, parties relying mostly on public subsidies will be able to pursue a general interest, rather than the (more radical) 4 policy preferences of their private donors (Nassmacher, 2009). Secondly, because it has been recently found that ‘private donations are associated with increased party extremism on the general left-right dimension’ (Tomashevskiy, 2019: 16), countries without public funding will be more prone to APEp’s success. For all these reasons, we hypothesize that H1a : Electoral support for APEp will be lower in countries where political parties have access to state subsidies than in those where there are none.…”

Section: Public Funding and Party Politicsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The few works in this field have primarily focused either on the United States (e.g. Hall, 2014; Masket and Miller, 2015) or on consolidated Western democracies (Bichay, 2020; Tomashevskiy, 2019). All of them not only ignore the issue in post-Communist democracies, but also prefer to examine the effects of campaign rather than party finance.…”

Section: Case Selectionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Paying for appeasement: On the moderating role of public subsidies in East Central European party politics

Bértoa

Rama

2021

Party Politics

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Focusing on the relationship between the access of political parties to direct public funding and electoral support for anti-political-establishment (e.g. populist, extremist) parties (APEp), this article tries to fill an important gap in the literature. Whereas previous contributions, mostly focused on the United States or established democracies in Western Europe, have presented contradictory findings, our study of 19 new democracies in East Central Europe clearly shows that the absence of state subsidies for political parties boosts support for those with an anti-political-establishment character. More importantly, and taking into account the minimum legal payout threshold that grants parties access to public subsidies, our results show that the more restrictive the regulations and the greater the difficulties faced by parties in obtaining state help, the higher the support for APEp. Our findings have obvious implications for the development of post-Communist party systems and the future of legislative (party funding) reform in the region.

show abstract

“…This group gives seven times more frequently than the bottom two-thirds of the population combined' (Wilcox, 2001, 117-118). Such a skewed distribution of donors among the population has been raising concerns in terms of ways in which this may affect inequality in access to political power, the more 'networked' political actors having greater advantages (Mutch, 2014), party extremism (Tomashevskiy, 2022), policy outcomes (Evertsson, 2018) and democratic processes more broadly (Hopkin, 2004;Cagé, 2020). These concerns have mostly emerged where private sources of income are dominant.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Mapping private party funding regulation. Deregulation in sight?

Piccio

2024

Riv. ital. sci. polit.

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

This article presents a longitudinal comparative analysis of the regulation of private funding to political parties in 15 West European democracies and explores how these rules have changed under the most recent wave of political finance reforms. In particular, the article questions whether a deregulation of political finance regulation may be in sight, with a downsizing of the role of the state in the political finance domain. While evidence does not support a clear movement toward deregulation, the article shows that the move from private to public subsidization may not be that irreversible as it seemed and that private funding to political parties is likely to become more prominent in the near future also in Europe.

show abstract

Does private money increase party extremism?

Cited by 3 publications

References 65 publications

Measuring the risk of corruption in Latin American political parties. De jure analysis of institutions

Measuring the risk of corruption in Latin American political parties. De jure analysis of institutions

Paying for appeasement: On the moderating role of public subsidies in East Central European party politics

Mapping private party funding regulation. Deregulation in sight?

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About