Cartel Appeals to the Court of Justice: The Song of the Sirens?

Camesasca, Peter D.; Ysewyn, Johan; Weck, Thomas; Bowman, Brian

doi:10.1093/jeclap/lpt016

Cited by 8 publications

(6 citation statements)

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“…Camesasca et al [2013] étudient les raisons qui peuvent expliquer le succès ou non d'un appel dans une affaire d'entente. Ils montrent que les appels dirigés contre le montant des amendes et en particulier contre les surcharges pour circonstance aggravante ou récidive sont les appels pour lesquels une révision par le Tribunal est la plus probable.…”

Section: Facteurs Influençant Le Résultat De L'appelunclassified

“…Depuis dix ans, les études statistiques et empiriques du droit de la concurrence se sont multipliées. Pour n'en donner que quelques exemples, on se contentera de citer les travaux de Geradin et Henry [2005], Connor et Bolotova [2006], Connor et Helmers [2006], Combe et Monnier [2011] et Allain et al [2015] sur les amendes dans les affaires d 'entente, de Brenner [2009] et Miller [2009 sur l'efficacité des programmes de clémence et de Harding et Gibbs [2005], Camesasca et al [2013] et Smuda, Bougette et Hüschelrath [2015] sur l'appel dans les affaires d'entente.…”

Section: Introductionunclassified

See 1 more Smart Citation

Analyse statistique des affaires d’ententes dans l’UE (2004-2014)

Broos¹,

Gautier²,

Ramos³

et al. 2016

Revue Économique

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Section: Facteurs Influençant Le Résultat De L'appelunclassified

Section: Introductionunclassified

Analyse statistique des affaires d’ententes dans l’UE (2004-2014)

Broos¹,

Gautier²,

Ramos³

et al. 2016

Revue Économique

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“… According to Camesasca et al (), appeals against cartel decisions often aim at obtaining a fine reduction, rather than an annulment of the fine, basically because it is rather unlikely that a firm was wrongly convicted for its participation in a cartel by the EC (or the procedural mistakes were so severe that the fine is annulled).…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

The Appeals Process in the European Commission's Cartel Cases: An Empirical Assessment

Hüschelrath

Smuda

2016

J Empirical Legal Studies

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The appeals process is an important mechanism to correct legal errors and to improve existing laws and regulations. We use the data of 467 firm groups that participated in 88 cartels convicted by the European Commission between 2000 and 2012 to study both the characteristics of firm groups filing an appeal and the factors that determine their successfulness in terms of fine reduction. Applying a discrete choice and a two‐stage hurdle model, we find that while some characteristics—particularly the reform of the fine guidelines—only affect the probability of filing an appeal, other factors, such as the size of the fine imposed, in connection with characteristics such as ringleader, repeat offender, or leniency applicant, influence both the probability and the success of an appeal. We build on these results to derive conclusions for both firms and public policymakers.

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“…8 8According to Camesasca et al (), appeals against cartel decisions often aim at obtaining a reduction rather than an annulment of the fine (basically because it is rather unlikely that a firm was wrongly convicted for its participation in a cartel by the EC).…”

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confidence: 99%

Determinants of the Duration of European Appellate Court Proceedings in Cartel Cases

Smuda

Bougette

Hüschelrath

2015

J of Common Market Studies

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Die Dis cus si on Pape rs die nen einer mög lichst schnel len Ver brei tung von neue ren For schungs arbei ten des ZEW. Die Bei trä ge lie gen in allei ni ger Ver ant wor tung der Auto ren und stel len nicht not wen di ger wei se die Mei nung des ZEW dar.Dis cus si on Papers are inten ded to make results of ZEW research prompt ly avai la ble to other eco no mists in order to encou ra ge dis cus si on and sug gesti ons for revi si ons. The aut hors are sole ly respon si ble for the con tents which do not neces sa ri ly repre sent the opi ni on of the ZEW. DETERMINANTS OF THE DURATION OF EUROPEAN APPELLATE COURT PROCEEDINGS IN CARTEL CASESFlorian Smuda # , Patrice Bougette * and Kai Hüschelrath  September 2014 AbstractThe duration of appellate court proceedings is an important determinant of the efficiency of a court system. We use data of 234 firm groups that participated in 63 cartels convicted by the European Commission between 2000 and 2012 to investigate the determinants of the duration of the subsequent one-or two-stage appeals process. We find that while the speed of the firststage appellate court decision depends on the court's appeals-related workload, the complexity of the case, the degree of cooperation by the firms involved and the clarity of the applied rules and regulations, the second-stage appellate court proceedings appear to be largely unaffected by those drivers. We take our empirical results to derive conclusions for both firms that plan to file an appeal as well as public policy makers.

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Cartel Appeals to the Court of Justice: The Song of the Sirens?

Cited by 8 publications

References 0 publications

Analyse statistique des affaires d’ententes dans l’UE (2004-2014)

Analyse statistique des affaires d’ententes dans l’UE (2004-2014)

The Appeals Process in the European Commission's Cartel Cases: An Empirical Assessment

Determinants of the Duration of European Appellate Court Proceedings in Cartel Cases

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