Catching-up and falling behind: Effects of learning in an R&D differential game with spillovers

Abstract

Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Catching-up and falling behind: Effects of learning in an R&D differential game with spillovers Terms of use: Documents in EconStor mayIn this paper we analyze the dynamics of an R&D differential game allowing for technological spillovers and sigmoid learning functions of multiproduct oligopolies. We demonstrate how the presence of learning together with spillovers may generate a rich set of outcomes, varying from constant leadership to catching-up and falling behind as well as from technology lock-in to a situation with a large number of high quality products. These types of outcomes are qualitatively different both from the single firm dynamics with learning and from the duopoly case with spillovers and without learning.

Games Without Winners: Catching-up with Asymmetric Spillovers

“…We thus observe that for a cooperative solution the number of participating firms may play stabilizing role as long as this number is finite, since this helps to select the regular (thus optimal) equilibrium as an outcome, while if there are infinitely many firms, the regular outcome cannot be reached. This finding agrees with (Bondarev and Greiner 2017), whereas the same claim has been made for decentralized system with symmetric efficiencies but non-linear dynamics. It turns out, that it is the piecewise nature (multiple modes of the game present) of the system which is crucial for the optimality and not the precise type of the underlying dynamical system regimes themselves.…”

“…This model is close to the setup in (Bondarev and Greiner 2017), where multiple regimes are also obtained, but all players invest with similar efficiency in new products' creation, i. e. ∀k : α − k = α + k = 1. As such that model is a degenerate case 2 of the more general setup considered here.…”

“…In this paper the consequences of introducing asymmetry in investments into the multi-modal R&D game are studied. The analysis reveals that for centralized solution the dynamics is qualitatively similar to that studied in (Bondarev and Greiner 2017), while for decentralized dynamics this is not the case.…”

“…The baseline framework closely follows that of (Bondarev and Greiner 2017). Some (arbitrary) number of R&D firms is engaged both in quality-improving innovations for existing products and in introduction of new products to the market.…”

Imitative innovation or independent innovation strategic choice of emerging economies in non-cooperative innovation competition

“…Henderson [19] found that leading companies invest more in incremental R&D, whereas follower (new entrants) concentrate on fundamental discovery. Bos et al [6] analyzes the nonmonotony of the relationships between various types of innovations throughout the industry life cycle. Henderson and Cockburn [20], Jaffe [21], Hassine et al [2], and more recently Bloom et al [3] conducted empirical studies on spillovers in R&D and found the ambiguous effects of spillovers on innovation.…”