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This paper proposes a reduced form model of dynamic duopoly in the context of heterogeneous innovations framework. Two agents invest into product and process innovations simultaneously. Every newly introduced product has its own dimension of process-improving innovations and there is a continuum of possible new products. In the area of process innovations the costless imitation effect is modelled while in the area of product innovations agents are cooperating with each other. As a result the specialization of innovative activity is observed. This specialization arises from strategic interactions of agents in both fields of innovative activity and is endogenously defined from the dynamics of the model.

This paper combines horizontal and vertical innovations to build an endogenous growth model that allows for structural change. Older technologies are continuously replaced by newer ones due to creative destruction and new technologies appear as a result of horizontal innovations and as a result of consumers' preferences for variety. We assume fixed operational costs for the manufacturing sector and an endogenously determined price of the patent for each new technology. The duration of a patent is not limited but every industry is profitable only for a certain period of time, thus making the effective time of existence of the technology endogenous and finite. We demonstrate that such an economy exhibits constant growth rates that are proportional to the average productivity growth, despite the ongoing disappearance of older technologies from the industry.JEL classification: O31, O34, O41

This paper combines horizontal and vertical innovations to build an endogenous growth model that allows for structural change. Older technologies are continuously replaced by newer ones due to creative destruction and new technologies appear as a result of horizontal innovations and as a result of consumers' preferences for variety. We assume fixed operational costs for the manufacturing sector and an endogenously determined price of the patent for each new technology. The duration of a patent is not limited but every industry is profitable only for a certain period of time, thus making the effective time of existence of the technology endogenous and finite. We demonstrate that such an economy exhibits constant growth rates that are proportional to the average productivity growth, despite the ongoing disappearance of older technologies from the industry.JEL classification: O31, O34, O41

Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Catching-up and falling behind: Effects of learning in an R&D differential game with spillovers Terms of use: Documents in EconStor mayIn this paper we analyze the dynamics of an R&D differential game allowing for technological spillovers and sigmoid learning functions of multiproduct oligopolies. We demonstrate how the presence of learning together with spillovers may generate a rich set of outcomes, varying from constant leadership to catching-up and falling behind as well as from technology lock-in to a situation with a large number of high quality products. These types of outcomes are qualitatively different both from the single firm dynamics with learning and from the duopoly case with spillovers and without learning.