Causal descriptivism

Kroon, Frederick

doi:10.1080/00048408712342731

Cited by 106 publications

(41 citation statements)

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“…Los defensores de esta idea sostienen una posición denominada descriptivismo causal, debido a Lewis (1984). Por su parte, Loar (1976), Kroon (1987; y Jackson (1998) defendieron propuestas semejantes como alternativas a la teoría causal pura. La idea básica de esta posición es que los hablantes asocian a un nombre "n" una descripción de la forma dc, que afirma que existe una entidad que está en la relación r con mi uso actual del nombre "n", donde r es construida de acuerdo al relato estándar de la transmisión de la referencia según la teoría causal.…”

Section: Descriptivismo Causal Acto I: Propiedades Esencialesunclassified

¿Soluciona el descriptivismo causal el problema de la referencia de los términos teóricos?

Borge¹

2017

Ideas Valores

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Las teorías de la referencia puramente descriptivistas o causales fracasan a la hora de dar cuenta del modo en que se fija y puede rastrearse la referencia de los términos teóricos. Psillos propuso dos versiones del descriptivismo causal que recogen argu-mentos presentes en defensas previas de dicha posición. Se trata de una teoría mixta que pretende solucionar el problema y acomodarse a intuiciones presentes en enfo-ques alternativos, como el que apela a oraciones de Ramsey. El artículo se propone mostrar la insuficiencia del descriptivismo causal como solución al problema de la referencia de los términos teóricos.

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Section: Descriptivismo Causal Acto I: Propiedades Esencialesunclassified

¿Soluciona el descriptivismo causal el problema de la referencia de los términos teóricos?

Borge¹

2017

Ideas Valores

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“…The view can be traced back to Evans (1973). Other notable proponents include Lewis (1984), Kroon (1987) and Nola (1980). Evans takes reference to be fixed by the dominant (causal) source of the speaker's descriptions.…”

Section: Causal-descriptivismmentioning

confidence: 99%

Saving the intuitions: polylithic reference

Votsis¹

2009

Synthese

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My main aim in this paper is to clarify the concepts of referential success and of referential continuity that are so crucial to the scientific realism debate. I start by considering the three dominant theories of reference and the intuitions that motivate each of them. Since several intuitions cited in support of one theory conflict with intuitions cited in support of another something has to give way. The traditional policy has been to reject all intuitions that clash with a chosen theory. A more radical policy, tied to some experimental philosophers, has called for the rejection of any evidential role for intuitions. I explore a largely ignored third alternative, i.e. saving intuitions (and their evidential role) even when they are at odds. To accommodate conflicting intuitions different sets of internally consistent (yet externally inconsistent) intuitions are taken to lend credence to different concepts of reference. In the current context, this means that the concepts of referential success and referential continuity are not monolithic. They are what I call 'polylithic'. This paper is as much about meta-philosophical concerns with the role of intuitions as it is about reference and the scientific realism debate. Regarding the former I hope that a blueprint will emerge for similar projects in other philosophical domains. Regarding the latter, I hope that polylithicity helps disentangle claims about referential success and continuity in the scientific realism debate by making perspicuous which concepts are best equipped to evaluate the realist's epistemic claims against the historical record of science.

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“…Their applications of the 2d framework are bound up with ambitious, controversial and sometimes divergent philosophical agendas, and their work has attracted a great deal of philosophical attention, both favourable and critical. antipodeans who have made contributions to developing or criticising generalised 2d semantics include Martin davies and Lloyd humberstone (1980), david braddon- Mitchell (2003Mitchell ( , 2004b, berit brogaard (2007, forthcoming), John hawthorne (2002), Fred Two-Dimensional Logic and Semantics Kroon (1987Kroon ( , 2004aKroon ( , 2004b, Michaelis Michael (1989Michael ( , 2004, philip pettit (2004a), Laura Schroeter (2005Schroeter ( , 2006, brian Weatherson (2001), and Kai yee Wong (1991Wong ( , 1996Wong ( , 2006.…”

Section: Laura Schroetermentioning

confidence: 99%

A Companion to Philosophy in Australia and New Zealand (Second Edition)

Oppy¹,

Trakakis²

2014

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Causal descriptivism

Cited by 106 publications

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¿Soluciona el descriptivismo causal el problema de la referencia de los términos teóricos?

¿Soluciona el descriptivismo causal el problema de la referencia de los términos teóricos?

Saving the intuitions: polylithic reference

A Companion to Philosophy in Australia and New Zealand (Second Edition)

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