The advent of formal definitions of the simplicity of a theory has important implications for model selection. But what is the best way to define simplicity?Forster and Sober ([1994]) advocate the use of Akaike's Information Criterion (AIC), a non-Bayesian formalisation of the notion of simplicity. This forms an important part of their wider attack on Bayesianism in the philosophy of science. We defend a Bayesian alternative: the simplicity of a theory is to be characterised in terms of Wallace's Minimum Message Length (MML). We show that AIC is inadequate for many statistical problems where MML performs well. Whereas MML is always defined, AIC can be undefined. Whereas MML is not known ever to be statistically inconsistent, AIC can be. Even when defined and consistent, AIC performs worse than MML on small sample sizes. MML is statistically invariant under 1-to-1 reparametrisation, thus avoiding a common criticism of Bayesian approaches. We also show that MML provides answers to many of Forster's objections to Bayesianism.Hence an important part of the attack on Bayesianism fails.

In this paper we describe a simple software system that allows students to practise their critical thinking skills by constructing argument maps of natural language arguments. As the students construct their maps of an argument, the system provides automatic, real time feedback on their progress. We outline the background and theoretical framework that led to the development of the system and then give a detailed example of how a student would work through a particular argument mapping exercise using the software. We then describe how the system was used in a single semester undergraduate critical thinking course. We evaluated the course using a standardised critical thinking test and measured an improvement in critical thinking skills of 0.45 standard deviations from pre-test to post-test; a modest, but encouraging result for a single semester course. We compare these results to those obtained in a number of other critical thinking courses, incorporating a variety of teaching methods. We conclude the paper with some comments on the limitations of the system and ways in which it might be improved and extended.

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In this book, Graham Oppy examines arguments for and against the existence of God. He shows that none of these arguments is powerful enough to change the minds of reasonable participants in debates on the question of the existence of God. His conclusion is supported by detailed analyses of the arguments as well as by the development of a theory about the purpose of arguments and the criteria that should be used in judging whether or not arguments are successful. Oppy discusses the work of a wide array of philosophers, including Anselm, Aquinas, Descartes, Locke, Leibniz, Kant, Hume and, more recently, Plantinga, Dembski, White, Dawkins, Bergman, Gale and Pruss.