Minimalism and Truth Aptness

Smith, Michael A.; Jackson, Frank; Oppy, Graham

doi:10.1093/mind/103.411.287

Cited by 103 publications

(36 citation statements)

References 6 publications

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“…the radical, allegedly neo-Wittgensteinian version discussed in the text. 31 See Jackson, Oppy, and Smith (1994); cf Rawls (1971) and Goodman (1954). 32 See O'Leary-Hawthorne (1994) for further discussion and references.…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Minimalism and Truth

O’Leary-Hawthorne

Oppy

1997

Nous

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Minimalism about truth has received considerable attention of late. We think that much of the discussion suffers from a pair of deficiencies. First, there has been a failure to discriminate different varieties and dimensions of minimalism about truth. Second, some serious and fundamental problems for the most popular varieties of minimalism about truth have not yet received sufficient attention. This paper aims to remedy those deficiencies.The paper is divided into three sections. In the first section, we distinguish six main varieties of minimalism about truth. In the second section, we identify four dimensions along which views about truth can be more or less minimal, thus clarifying the range of relevant notions of "minimality". In the third section, we critically discuss four minimalist theses.

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Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Minimalism and Truth

O’Leary-Hawthorne

Oppy

1997

Nous

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“…Other authors, moreover, such as Divers and Miller (1994), Wright (1992), and Horwich (1993), have developed arguments similar to Boghossian's, which exploit the idea that any 'minimalist' theory of truth implies the truth aptness of ethical statements. These results have however been disputed by Jackson, Oppy, and Smith (1994), and Smith (1994). Since it is not my present aim to assess the soundness of Boghossian's argument nor, a fortiori, to assess the seriousness of the purported inconsistency between ethical non-cognitivism and minimalism, any detailed discussion of this literature is unfortunately beyond the scope of this paper.…”

Section: Trent University Canadamentioning

confidence: 89%

Wittgenstein, Non-Factualism, and Deflationism

Connelly

2013

International Journal of Philosophical Studies

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Amongst those views sometimes attributed to the later Wittgenstein are included both a deflationary theory of truth, as well as a non-factualism about certain regions of discourse. Evidence in favor of the former attribution, it is thought, can be found in Wittgenstein's apparent affirmation of the basic definitional equivalence of 'p' is true and p in x136 of his Philosophical Investigations. Evidence in favor of the latter attribution, it might then be presumed, can be found in the context of the so-called 'private language argument', wherein Wittgenstein provides an expressivist treatment of first-person present tense sensation utterances. In this paper, by contrast, I will argue that Wittgenstein's later philosophy is best understood as endorsing neither a non-factualism about sensation utterances, nor a deflationism about truth. Wittgenstein should instead be understood as offering a 'mixed' view of sensation utterances according to which some while not others are apt for expressivist treatment. Moreover, he should be thought of as identifying truth-conditions with semantic 'correctness-conditions', and thus truth with semantic 'assertibility'.

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“…Jackson (1998b) is probably the most central, a book-length defence of an approach to conceptual analysis in the Canberra Plan tradition. Jackson, oppy and Smith (1994) is the paper that sparked the original 'Canberra Plan' label in o' Leary-hawthorne and Price (1996). tooley (1987) and Smith (1994) are both books that carry out Canberra-Plan-style analyses.…”

Section: Daniel Nolanmentioning

confidence: 99%