Minimalism and Truth

Abstract

Minimalism about truth has received considerable attention of late. We think that much of the discussion suffers from a pair of deficiencies. First, there has been a failure to discriminate different varieties and dimensions of minimalism about truth. Second, some serious and fundamental problems for the most popular varieties of minimalism about truth have not yet received sufficient attention. This paper aims to remedy those deficiencies.The paper is divided into three sections. In the first section, we distinguish six main varieties of minimalism about truth. In the second section, we identify four dimensions along which views about truth can be more or less minimal, thus clarifying the range of relevant notions of "minimality". In the third section, we critically discuss four minimalist theses.

Simplifying Alethic Pluralism

“…6 6 One type of deflationism is Horwich's (1998) “minimalist” view. See Field 1994 for an alternative type of deflationism and O'Leary‐Hawthorne and Oppy 1997 for an overview of deflationist theories. It is also worth noting that another deflationary option here, which will not be discussed, is to take a deflationary view of facts, as opposed to an explicitly deflationary view of truth.…”

TRUTH AS ONE(S) AND MANY: ON LYNCH'S ALETHIC FUNCTIONALISM1

“…Note that there are many kinds of views that could be described as “deflationary,” and the characterization provided here is intended to be as neutral as possible. See O'Leary‐Hawthorne and Oppy (1997) for a useful overview.…”