Centered assertion

Torre, Stephan

doi:10.1007/s11098-009-9399-1

Cited by 37 publications

(27 citation statements)

References 4 publications

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“…3). Yalcin (2007) and Torre (forthcoming) present accounts similar in spirit to the one presented here.…”

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confidence: 69%

De Se Attitudes: Ascription and Communication15

Ninan

2010

Philosophy Compass

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This paper concerns two points of intersection between de se attitudes and the study of natural language: attitude ascription and communication. I first survey some recent work on the semantics of de se attitude ascriptions, with particular attention to ascriptions that are true only if the subject of the ascription has the appropriate de se attitude. I then examine – and attempt to solve – some problems concerning the role of de se attitudes in linguistic communication.

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“…3). Yalcin (2007) and Torre (forthcoming) present accounts similar in spirit to the one presented here.…”

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confidence: 69%

De Se Attitudes: Ascription and Communication15

Ninan

2010

Philosophy Compass

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“…We now have contents that it is correct to believe for some, but not all thinkers. Therefore successful information transfer can no longer generally consist in someone correctly believing, then asserting, some content, and an audience as a result coming to believe the very same content (see Stalnaker 2008, Ninan 2010a, Ninam 2010b, Torre 2010, Stojanovic 2012, Kindermann 2012, Weber 2012.…”

Section: Portability and Lack Of Portabilitymentioning

confidence: 99%

The Conversational Role of Centered Contents

Kölbel

2013

Inquiry

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Some philosophers, for example David Lewis, have argued for the need to introduce de se contents or centered contents, i.e. contents of thought and speech the correctness of believing which depends not only on the possible world one inhabits, but also on the location one occupies. Independently, philosophers like Robert Stalnaker (and also David Lewis) have developed the conversational score model of linguistic communication. This conversational model usually relies on a more standard conception of content according to which the correctness of believing a content depends merely on the possible world one occupies. The aim of this paper is to develop a modified conversational score model that operates with centered contents. I begin by explaining how in principle centered contents can figure in the transfer of information from one thinker to another. Here I distinguish the local portability approach from the portable surrogate approach. Then I explain how these modes of information transfer can be exploited in a stalnakerian conversational model involving centered contents, proposing a modified update rule for assertion. Preliminaries 1Semantic theories for natural languages usually employ some notion of semantic content. A semantics for a given language L will assign such contents to sentences at contexts of use. These assignments are supposed, via some further assumptions, to allow predictions as to the conditions under which the utterance of a sentence of L would be true, and derivatively predictions about logical truth and logical consequence (see e.g. Lewis 1970, p. 190; Kaplan 1977, p. 522;Predelli 2006; Stanley 2007, introduction;Partee 2010). Data concerning the truth conditions of (potential) utterances are assumed to be observable 2 independently and thereby to provide a method for empirically testing the semantics. The contents assigned to sentences in context are usually treated as multi-purpose representational contents, i.e. contents that can model representational aspects of linguistic utterances as well as of mental states, such as beliefs. Whether they are called "thoughts", "propositions", "contents" or whatever, the basic idea is the same: these entities represent the world in some way, and and certain utterances (e.g. assertions) or states (e.g. beliefs) with such an entity as content can be assessed as to their success in representing the world. This 1 Those already familiar with recent discussions of communication with centered contents, who are keen to cut straight to the issues, and who are not interested in preliminary or foundational questions, can safely skip this section. 2 Observation is a problematic notion, and it is no less problematic in this case. If, for example, we think of the predictions as concerning a shared language, then we might consult the judgements of competent users of that language as to the conditions under which it would be correct to use a sentence. Thus we would be operating on the assumption that there is a correlation between these users' judgements ...

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“…) By contrast, the contemporary authors discussed here put forward a non-referential treatment of the content of (a certain subclass of) de se attitudes, but typically remain neutral as to the relationship between this mental content and the content communicated by utterances containing a first-person pronoun. Stojanovic (2012) and Torre (2010) are rare examples of relativist analyses of de se assertions. But for the most part, on the linguistic side, relativist semantics has been confined to the treatment of expressions containing more diffuse marks of a subject's point of view (e.g.…”

Section: /26mentioning

confidence: 99%

The limits of selflessness: semantic relativism and the epistemology of de se thoughts

Guillot

2013

Synthese

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It has recently been proposed that the framework of semantic relativism be put to use to describe mental content, as deployed in some of the fundamental operations of the mind. This programme has inspired in particular a novel strategy of accounting for the essential egocentricity of first-personal or de se thoughts in relativist terms, with the advantage of dispensing with a notion of self-representation. This paper is a critical discussion of this strategy. While it is based on a plausible appeal to cognitive economy, the relativist theory does not fully account for the epistemic profile that distinguishes de se thinking, as some of its proponents hope to do. A deeper worry concerns the reliance of the theory on a primitive notion of "centre" that hasn't yet received enough critical attention, and is ambiguous between a thin and a rich reading. I argue that while the rich reading is required if the relativist analysis of the de se is to achieve its most ambitious aims, it also deprives the theory of much of its explanatory power.

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Centered assertion

Cited by 37 publications

References 4 publications

De Se Attitudes: Ascription and Communication15

De Se Attitudes: Ascription and Communication15

The Conversational Role of Centered Contents

The limits of selflessness: semantic relativism and the epistemology of de se thoughts

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