De Se Attitudes: Ascription and Communication15

Ninan, Dilip

doi:10.1111/j.1747-9991.2010.00290.x

Cited by 71 publications

(46 citation statements)

References 23 publications

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“…Lewis (1983aLewis ( , 1986) offers a slightly different implementation of Hazen's basic idea, analysing metaphysical possibility in terms of a relation between sequences of possible individuals. In other work (Ninan 2008(Ninan , 2010, I represent attitudinal alternatives using sequenced worlds, formal objects which are closely related to Lewis's sequences of possibilia (see Torre 2010 as well). There are some subtle differences between the sequenced worlds approach and the present account, most of which do not matter for present purposes.…”

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Counterfactual attitudes and multi-centered worlds

Ninan

2012

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Counterfactual attitudes like imagining, dreaming, and wishing create a problem for the standard formal semantic theory of de re attitude ascriptions. I show how the problem can be avoided if we represent an agent's attitudinal possibilities using multi-centered worlds, possible worlds with multiple distinguished individuals, each of which represents an individual with whom the agent is acquainted. I then present a compositional semantics for de re ascriptions according to which singular terms are assignmentsensitive expressions and attitude verbs are assignment shifters.

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Counterfactual attitudes and multi-centered worlds

Ninan

2012

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“…La formalisation de la croyance de re introduit en outre la variable xs qui représente le pronom à la première personne, « je ». L'évaluation sémantique de ce type de formules, suggérée par [Lewis 1979] (voir aussi [Ninan 2010]), se fait non pas simplement relativement à un monde, mais relativement à un monde centré ⟨w, α⟩, c'est-à-dire à une paire composée d'un monde et d'un agent (cf. Annexe).…”

Section: Proxies Et Attitudes De Seunclassified

“…On trouve chez [Ninan 2010] l'idée d'une suite de centres pour évaluer des phrases comme « Je t'appellerai demain quand je saurai si Ernst veut venir », où le locuteur n'est que l'un des centres du contexte. c. de se :…”

Section: Proxies Et Attitudes De Seunclassified

Représentations de soi et modalités

Rebuschi¹

2012

philosophiascientiae

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International audiencePersonal pronouns can refer to some physical representation (like a statue or a photograph) of a person rather than to the person herself. The paper presents an account of such binding without apparent identity. An objection is made to Reuland and Winter’s theory of proxies, based on the distinction between de re and de se attitudes. The strategy proposed here is to introduce a new modality for each new physical representation. This avoids proxies and restores the identity at the base of anaphora resolution. The new modal operators correspond to modal windows through which the subject can grasp objects, existing or not, including herself. The proposed semantics entails a reinterpretation of predicates. It borrows from Wehmeier the idea of cross-world relations, which in itself raises metaphysical questions. The article addresses these issues and finally suggests to extend the theory of modal windows to all intentional relations.Les pronoms personnels peuvent faire référence à la représentation physique (comme une statue ou une photographie) d’une personne plutôt qu’à cette personne elle-même. L’article présente une explication de ce liage sans identité apparente. Une objection est adressée à la théorie des proxies de Reuland et Winter, fondée sur la distinction entre attitudes de re et attitudes de se. La stratégie proposée ici consiste à introduire une nouvelle modalité pour chaque nouveau support d’une représentation physique, ce qui permet d’éviter les proxies et de restaurer l’identité à la base de la résolution des anaphores. Les modalités correspondent à des fenêtres modales au travers desquelles le sujet peut appréhender des objets, existants ou non, y compris lui-même. La sémantique proposée suppose de réinterpréter certains prédicats. Elle emprunte à Wehmeier l’idée de relation inter-mondaine, qui soulève en tant que telle des questions métaphysiques. L’article aborde ces questions, pour proposer finalement d’étendre la théorie des fenêtres modales à l’ensemble des relations intentionnelles

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“…See e.g. Ninan, , sect 3.1. I argue elsewhere (Dinges, ) that these independent problems do not carry over to relativism as I am understanding this position.…”

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Relativism, Disagreement and Testimony

Dinges

2017

Pacific Philosophical Qtr

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This article brings together two sets of data that are rarely discussed in concert; namely, disagreement and testimony data. I will argue that relativism yields a much more elegant account of these data than its major rival, contextualism. The basic idea will be that contextualists can account for disagreement data only by adopting principles that preclude a simple account of testimony data. I will conclude that, other things being equal, we should prefer relativism to contextualism. In making this comparative point, I will also defend self‐standing relativist accounts of disagreement and testimony data.

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De Se Attitudes: Ascription and Communication15

Cited by 71 publications

References 23 publications

Counterfactual attitudes and multi-centered worlds

Counterfactual attitudes and multi-centered worlds

Représentations de soi et modalités

Relativism, Disagreement and Testimony

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